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THE SCHEMES OF ADVENTURESSES:1 THE ABOLITION
AND REVIVAL OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
CHARLOTTE K. GOLDBERG*
ABSTRACT
Common-law marriage is about to go the way of the buggy whip.
In 2005, Pennsylvania abolished common-law marriage and other
state legislatures are considering following Pennsylvania's lead. Even
if common-law marriage is abolished in all states, the problem of un-
married cohabitants seeking property rights arising from their rela-
tionships will still challenge the courts. In particular, because most
claimants are women, the perception of them as either an "adven-
turess" or a "virtuous wife" will often determine whether they will
attain shared property rights.
This article uses the California experience as an illustration of
the evolution of the law from the abolition of common-law marriage
in 1895 to the re-evaluation of cohabitant rights in the landmark case
of Marvin v. Marvin in 1976. Post-Marvin litigation in both California
and Washington state provide a paradigm for dealing with cohabitant
property claims in the twenty-first century. In essence, courts have
revived common-law marriage in another form today. The emergence
of the concept of a "committed intimate relationship" for determining
whether a cohabitant can attain shared property rights is instructive.
A committed intimate relationship is one that resembles common-law
marriage with the additional requirement of intertwined financial
affairs. An analysis of common-law marriage cases in the nineteenth
century and present-day cohabitant cases shows that the main deter-
minant is still whether the cohabitant is cast in the role of "adven-
turess" (or adventurer) or has fulfilled the role of "virtuous wife."
1. "Adventuress" is an old-fashioned word for what today would be called a "gold
digger." Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There's No 'I Do" A Model for Awarding
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1029-30 (1995). Common-
law marriage was originally thought to protect women from men who would take advan-
tage of their innocence by convincing them that a formal ceremony was unnecessary. Ariela
R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957,
964 (2000). As women began to view the doctrine as a means to gain the monetary bene-
fits of marriage, they became branded as "adventuresses," "conniving and gold digging
women preying on the goodwill of innocent men .... Id.
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CONCLUSION
Myth: In California, if a man and a woman live together
for seven years, they have a common-law marriage.2
Fact: Common-law marriage was abolished in California
in 1895. s
Reality: Today, a relationship resembling common-law
marriage will result in a successful claim to share
property accumulated during the relationship.4
INTRODUCTION
Many cohabiting couples in California may believe that common-
law marriage is legal.5 When their relationship ends, they find out
they were mistaken and their relationship was not a marriage at
2. Where this myth originated is unclear. An informal survey of incoming law students
confirmed that even though the California legislature abolished common-law marriage
in 1895, many Californians think they have a common-law marriage after living together
for seven years. Survey conducted by Charlotte Goldberg, Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School, in L.A., Cal. (1997) (on file with author). The "seven years" portion of the myth
possibly originated from the Supreme Court case addressing the issue of common law
marriage, Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877), where the parties, William and Mary, lived
together for seven years.
3. OTTo E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 94 (1922).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants:
A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (1984).
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all.' The courts view them as unmarried cohabitants.7 Any rights
accruing from their relationship depend on being able to state a
"Marvin" claim,8 based on the doctrine enunciated in the 1976 land-
mark case of Marvin v. Marvin.' The Marvin doctrine is based in
part on the rationale that treating unmarried cohabitants as married
would revive common-law marriage that was abolished in California
in 1895.10
The purpose of this article is to examine why common-law
marriage was abolished in California in 189511 and consider whether
it has been revived in another form today. 2 Although there was a
general movement in the United States in the late 1800's to abolish
common-law marriage, 3 several questions arise about abolition in
California. First, what were the events that led the California legis-
lature to consider the question of common-law marriage? Second,
why did the legislature abolish common-law marriage and why then?
And finally, when dealing with the property claims of unmarried co-
habitants, 4 has common-law marriage been revived in a different
form today?
6. Id. at 1682-88.
7. KOEGEL, supra note 3, at 94.
8. Reppy, supra note 5, at 1689.
9. 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
10. See infra Part I.C. The bills abolishing common-law marriage were passed
unanimously in 1895. KOEGEL, supra note 3, at 94. Today, marriage is defined as "a
personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which
the consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone
does not constitute marriage. Consent must be followed by the issuance of a license and
solemnization .... CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2006). California does recognize common-
law marriages from other jurisdictions if "valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which
the marriage was contracted." CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2006).
11. KOEGEL, supra note 3, at 94.
12. Some argue that "many of the jurisdictions that claim to have abolished common-
law marriage have, in fact, resurrected the doctrine under another name." Hon. John B.
Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-law Marriage: A Consideration of the Con-
tinued Viability of the Common-law Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 399, 400 (1998).
13. STEVEN MINTZ & SusAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLuTIONS 126 (1988).
14. This article deals solely with the claims for shared property rights arising from
a non-marital relationship between a man and a woman. The claims for support rights
arising from the relationship are beyond the scope of this article. For more information
on support claims see Charlotte K Goldberg, Virtual Marriage: Examining Support Claims
by Ex-Cohabitants, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Oct. 14, 1997, at 7. This article also does not
deal extensively with claims of same-sex couples. California law does allow same-sex
couples, who are not domestic partners, to take advantage of the Marvin doctrine. Whorton
v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Also beyond the scope of this
article are unmarried cohabitants' claims against third parties, such as wrongful death
claims, and claims for governmental benefits, such as social security. See Grace Ganz
Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1125, 1126 (1981).
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The short answer is that common-law marriage was abolished in
California after a spate of lawsuits involving prominent and wealthy
California men who had relationships with younger women.15 In each
case, the woman claimed to be married and the man denied a mar-
riage existed. 6 One particularly notorious case, Sharon v. Sharon,
was in the public spotlight for over seven years. 7 In that case, Sarah
Althea Sharon's attorney stated in one sentence the major issue in
all of these common-law marriage cases: "[s]he goes from this court-
room either vindicated as an honest and virtuous wife or branded as
an adventuress, a blackmailer, a perjurer and a harlot."'" Even though
the women, including Sarah Althea, were generally unsuccessful in
proving that they were married, 9 "[s]o many fraudulent cases were
brought throughout the State, and such fierce litigation arose that
it became a stench in the nostrils of the people."2 The legislative de-
cision to abolish common-law marriage in 1895 was intended "to
close the door to fraud and to forever and effectually [sic] put an end
to this class of litigation."2
At the heart of the common-law marriage cases was an effort by
the women to gain the benefits of marriage.22 Under California's com-
munity property system, a wife was entitled to one-half of the commu-
nity property at death.23 At divorce, she was also entitled to alimony.24
Therefore, as a wife, she could claim she had a right to share in the
community property; as a mistress, she may have had no recourse.
Some of the women in the reported cases had embarked on the rela-
tionship to seek the support of the wealthy man.25 When he ended the
relationship or died, she turned to the courts relying on California's
version of common-law marriage.26 She usually did not succeed.2
15. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735 (Cal. 1895); People v. Beevers, 33 P. 844 (Cal. 1893);
Kilburn v. Kilburn, 26 P. 636 (Cal. 1891); White v. White, 23 P. 276 (Cal. 1890); Sharon v.
Sharon, 7 P. 456 (Cal. 1885).
16. See supra note 15.
17. MILTON S. GOULD, A CAST OF HAWKS 178 (1985), ROBERT H. KRONINGER, SARAH
AND THE SENATOR 12 (1964).
18. GOULD, supra note 17, at 253.
19. See supra note 15.
20. Respondent's Reply Brief at 15, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Dec. 4, 1897) (No.
469).
21. Id. at 16.
22. Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage: An Appraisal of Trends in
Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88, 98 (1960).
23. GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 297-99 (1979).
24. Id. at 294.
25. See White v. White, 23 P. 276 (Cal. 1890); OSCAR LEWIS & CARROLL D. HALL,
BONANZA INN 121-26 (1939).
26. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735 (Cal. 1895); People v. Beevers, 33 P. 844 (Cal. 1893);
Kilburn v. Kilburn, 26 P. 636 (Cal. 1891); White v. White, 23 P. 276 (Cal. 1890); Sharon v.
Sharon, 7 P. 456 (Cal. 1885).
27. See supra note 26.
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Between 1889 and 1895, the California Supreme Court decided five
cases dealing with common-law marriage.28 In only one was the
plaintiff successful in sustaining her claim that she was married.29
The final common-law marriage case, Hinckley v. Ayres, was decided
January 2, 1895.30 That case was also highly publicized, and again the
conclusion was that the woman was not married to the prominent
Thomas H. Blythe.3 1 Legislators had introduced bills in earlier ses-
sions of the legislature, but finally, on March 26, 1895, the Senate
and Assembly amended the law to abolish common-law marriage.
The main impetus for abolishing common-law marriage was to
prevent fraud by women perceived as adventuresses - women who
were attempting to convert an illicit relationship into a marriage to
gain monetary benefits.3 Another motivation reflected a completely
opposite perception of women: women needed protection from unscru-
pulous men who would take advantage of their youth and nalvet6.34
For instance, an older man might convince a young woman to enter
into a sexual relationship with the assurance that they were married
at common law.35 If later the man would abandon this woman and
deny that they were married, a woman who thought she was an "hon-
est and virtuous" wife could be left without support and the possibility
of having a child stigmatized as illegitimate. If, however, common-law
marriage was no longer an option, these women would be protected
by knowing that cohabitation would not result in a legal marriage.
Both these contrary perceptions of women - one who fraudulently
sought the benefits of marriage36 and the other one who needed pro-
tection from fraud37 - led to the demise of common-law marriage.
31
After the abolition of common-law marriage, unmarried cohab-
itants' rights to shared property were extremely limited until the
1960s and 1970s when traditional concepts of marriage were called
into question.39 As divorce became more common and informal rela-
tionships between men and women increased, California courts re-
evaluated the issue of whether property rights could arise based on a
28. See supra note 26.
29. White v. White, 23 P. 276, 284 (Cal. 1890).
30. 39 P. 735 (Cal. 1895).
31. Id.; see infra notes 144-72.
32. KOEGEL, supra note 3, at 94.
33. Ariela Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 957, 1001 (2000).
34. Id. at 1002.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1001.
37. Id. at 1002.
38. Id.
39. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 247-63 (2005).
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relationship between unmarried cohabitants .40 Although one Califor-
nia Court of Appeal case seemed to revive common-law marriage in
the guise of an "actual family relationship,' the California Supreme
Court rejected that approach in the 1976 case Marvin v. Marvin.42
The Supreme Court opted for contract theory to provide unmarried
cohabitants the possibility of gaining property rights.4' Examination
of the post-Marvin cases demonstrates that many of the same charac-
teristics that would define a common-law marriage would also result
in a successful Marvin claim.44
After Marvin, the major determinative issue is usually whether
the cohabitants have an implied-in-fact agreement to share property.45
To establish an implied agreement to share property, the courts must
examine the couple's conduct.4" Those couples whose relationship is
most like a traditional marriage are likeliest to exhibit an implied
agreement to share property.47 Ordinarily that means that the couple
has lived together for a number of years, has held themselves out as
husband and wife, have intertwined financial dealings, and may have
had children together.45 When the couple has a relationship that looks
more like lover-mistress with no sharing of finances, the court will
likely find no implied agreement to share property.49 Despite abolition
of the common-law marriage doctrine, the reality is that those couples
whose relationships most resemble a traditional marriage would also
be able to meet the Marvin requirement of an implied agreement to
share property.5 °
The number of states recognizing common-law marriage is
clearly decreasing.5' Pennsylvania abolished common-law marriage
40. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P. 2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
41. Cary v. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
42. Marvin, 557 P. 2d at 106.
43. Id. at 113.
44. See infra Part II.
45. Marvin, 557 P. 2d at 113.
46. Id. at 117.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See infra Part II.A.
49. See infra Part II.A.
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. Only nine states, Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, and the District of Columbia still recognize common-law
marriage. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (West 2006); Creel v. Creel, 763 So. 2d 943, 946
(Ala. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-100 (West 2006);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2005); In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612,
617 (Iowa 2004); Demelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 177-78 (R.I. 2004); In re Estate of Ober,
62 P. 3d 1114, 1115 (Mont. 2003); Stinchcomb v. Stinchcomb, 674 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Okla.
1983); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977). New Hampshire recognizes
common-law marriage only at death. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2006). Utah recog-
nized common-law marriage by statute in 1987 in an effort to combat welfare fraud.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2006); see also Ryan D. Tenney, Tom Green, Common-law
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prospectively as of January 1, 200552 and other states are considering
following Pennsylvania. 53 The move to abolish common-law marriage
is driven partially by the desire to formalize all informal relation-
ships, both same-sex and opposite-sex. 54 In the case of opposite-sex
couples, because it is so easy to formalize their relationship,5 states
see no reason to continue to recognize informal relationships as
common-law marriage. Just as California abolished common-law
marriage because of the specter of fraud and misuse of the courts,56
so too do today's supporters of abolition use that rationale.57 Despite
marriage, and the Illegality of Putative Polygamy, 17 B.Y.U. J. PUBL. L 141, 148-50 (2006).
52. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 2006). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
called the common-law marriage doctrine into question in Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer,
714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998). A later case interpreted Staudenmayer as foreshadowing the
eventual abolition of the doctrine. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). See Ryan P. Newell, "To Be Sure He
is My Husband Good Enough," Or is He? An Analysis of Common-law marriage in
Pennsylvania, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 337 (2004). The legislature clarified the court
decisions and acted in 2004 to abolish common-law marriage prospectively. 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 2006).
53. Colorado considered limiting or abolishing common-law marriage after a thirty-
four-year-old man, accused of sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old girl claimed that
they had a common-law marriage. Katie Mccrimmon, At 12, Birthday Cake, Not Wedding
Cake; Legislators Plan to Cut Loophole from Common-Law Marriage, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
June 17, 2006, at 4A; Howard Pankratz, Quick Fix on Child Brides, DENVER POST, June
22, 2006 at A-1. In New Hampshire, a bill was introduced to abolish New Hampshire's
limited common-law marriage law. H.R. 427, 2005 Leg., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2005). In
Oklahoma, a bill was introduced in 2005 to prohibit recognition of common-law marriage.
H.R. 1455, 2005 Leg., 50th Sess. (Okla. 2005). In South Carolina, the Legislature in 2000
established the minimum age of sixteen for entering into a common-law marriage, S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-1-100 (2006), and considered abolishing common-law marriage in the 2005
and 2006 sessions. See H.R. 3588, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005); S. 1106, 2006 Leg.,
116th Sess. (S.C. 2006).
54. In California, domestic partnership legislation is a prime example. Couples, both
same-sex and opposite-sex, must register their domestic partnership with the Secretary
of State. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2006). California law defines domestic partners as
"two adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed
relationship of mutual caring." CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2006). The requirements
for establishing a domestic relationship resemble marriage in several respects, such as
age of consent and consanguinity. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(4) (West 2006). Opposite-sex
couples must be eligible for Social Security benefits, and one or both must be over the
age of sixty-two. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (West 2006).
55. Even couples who have lived together as husband and wife without marrying can
enter into a "confidential marriage." CAL. FAM. CODE § 500 (West 2006). The marriage will
be recorded but generally will not be open to the public. CAL. FAM. CODE § 511 (West 2006).
56. Cynthia Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage,
75 OR. L. REV. 709, 732-36 (1996).
57. When Georgia abolished common-law marriage in 1996 along with a ban on same-
sex marriage, one legislator explained that "[clommon-law marriage is a frontier concept
which evolved from a well-intentioned, family-created practice to one now fraught with
fraud, disappointment, dishonesty and deception." Senate Vote Bans Same-Sex Marriage
Common-Law Unions Also Would Be Barred, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at B6
(quoting Sen. Diana Harvey Johnson, D-Savannah). Professor Walter 0. Weyrauch
summarized the arguments favoring abolition or retention of common-law marriage in
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this trend, the abolition of common-law marriage does not signal the
end of claims of unmarried cohabitants who accumulate property
during their relationship. Thus it is important to examine judicial ap-
proaches in the post-Marvin era. Both California and Washington,
community property states, have developed jurisprudence that allows
unmarried couples in certain relationships to have property rights
similar to those of married couples.5"
In essence, this article recognizes that the problem of sorting out
the property rights of unmarried cohabitants remains today. Even if
all states abolished common-law marriage, the issue of determining
property rights of cohabitants will continue to challenge the courts.
The experiences of California and Washington State provide some
guidance to courts on how to determine whether a particular case is
merely a "scheme of an adventuress" or a legitimate claim of a deserv-
ing cohabitant who has fulfilled the role of a "virtuous wife."59
Part I of this article chronicles the history of the abolition of
common-law marriage and the development of the doctrine of cohabi-
tants' property rights in California. Part II examines the current law
of cohabitants' property rights in California and Washington State.
Both states' laws illustrate how cohabitant relationships that most re-
semble traditional marriage are able to gain property rights similar
to those of married couples. A streamlined version of the Washington
doctrine is suggested as the best way to sort out who should attain
shared property rights.
PART I
A. History of Common-Law Marriage in California
The acceptance of common-law marriage in the United States
dates back to the 1809 New York decision of Fenton v. Reed.60 By the
Informal and Formal Marriage: An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U.
CHI. L. REV. 88, 97-104 (1960). Recently there has been a move to try to preserve common-
law marriage, particularly to protect the rights of women disadvantaged by a long-term
cohabitant relationship in which the men worked and accumulated property in their
names. See generally, Henry Baskin, Important Changes in the Law During the 20th
Century: The Abolition of Common-law marriage, 79 MICH. B.J. 176 (2000); Cynthia Grant
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common-law marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709,
779 (1996); John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A
Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29
CUMB. L. REV. 399, 410-15, 424-25 (1999); William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support
Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1677 (1984).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2006); Oliver v. Fowler, 126 P.3d 69 (Wash. Ct
App. 2006).
59. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
60. 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
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time the United States Supreme Court put its imprimatur on common-
law marriage in 1877,61 a majority of states recognized common-law
marriage.6 2 Yet a counter movement to abolish common-law marriage
gained strength toward the end of the century and has continued to
the present.63 Common-law marriages were considered "thoroughly
bad, involving social evils of the most dangerous character"64 and
couples who entered into such marriages "deliberately take up an illic-
it relation with each other and start a life of immorality and shame."65
This moral disdain for illicit relationships led to legislative efforts to
abolish common-law marriage and to restrain the courts' recognition
of informal marriages.66
Soon after California was admitted to the Union in 1850,67 the
California Supreme Court recognized common-law marriage in
HEARTH, LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURYAMERICA 70 (1985); Ariella R. Dubler,
Governing through Contract: Common-law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107
YALE L.J. 1885, 1885-89 (1998).
61. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
62. Dubler, supra note 60, at 1890.
63. GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 83-90. The following states abolished common-law
marriage before the turn of the twentieth century: Kentucky (1866) (Estill v. Rogers, 64
Ky. 62 (Ky. 1866)), Arkansas (1875) (Bowman, supra note 57, at 732), North Dakota (1890)
(GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 377 (1979)); Massachusetts
(1892) (Id. at 410), Washington (1892) (In re MacLaughlin's Estate, 30 P. 651 (Wash. 1892)),
and California (1895) (OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1922)). The following states abolished common-law marriage
near the turn of the century: Illinois (1905) (Douthwaite, supra note 63, at 353), New
Mexico (1905) (William Reppy, Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants:
A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1706), and Arizona (1913)
(Bowman, supra note 57, at 732). The following states abolished common-law marriage
during World War I and the post-war era: Alaska (1917) (Bowman, supra note 57, at 733),
Wisconsin (1917) (DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at 598), Hawaii (1920) (Vivian Hamilton,
Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 328 (2004)), Missouri
(1921) (Id. at 436), Nebraska (1923) (Id. at 448), Louisiana (1927) (Reppy, supra note 63,
at 1706), New York (1933) (DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at 479), Virginia (1919) (VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-14 (West 2006)), and New Jersey (1939) (DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at 462).
The following states abolished common-law marriage during World War II: Minnesota
(1941) (Id. at 425), Connecticut (1942) (Id. at 305), Nevada (1943) (Id. at 453), and
Wyoming (1943) (Id. at 604-05). The following states abolished common-law marriage
in the post-WWIIIBaby-boomer era: Maryland (1952) (Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d
403 (Md. 1952)), Tennessee (1955) (DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at 462), Mississippi (1956)
(Id. at 431), Michigan (1957) (Hamilton, supra note 63, at 328), and South Dakota (1959)
(DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63, at 548). The following states abolished common-law marriage
during the counter-culture era (1960's and 70's): Delaware (1962) (Id. at 311-12), West
Virginia (1968) (Id. at 594), Florida (1968) (Id. at 325), Maine (1969) (Pierce v. Secretary
of U.S. Dept. Of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 254 A.2d 46 (Me. 1969)), North Carolina
(1975) (DOUTHWAITE, supra note 63 at 490), Oregon (1976) (Id. at 518-19), and Vermont
(1978) (Id. at 578).
64. GEORGE HOWARD, THE HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 171 (1904); see also
GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 86-90.
65. W.C. RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 67 (1899).
66. GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 92.
67. THEODORE H. HITTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 387 (1898).
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Graham v. Bennett.68 The court found that Tillatha Bennett and Isaac
Graham were validly married, at least regarding the issue of the
legitimacy of their children.69 The court defined marriage as a "civil
contract" that is valid and binding on "an assumption of the relative
duties which it imposes on each other."7 The contract in question was
a written one that Isaac had presented to Tillatha. v1 It seems that
this type of written contract derived from Mexican law was imported
to Spanish North America.72 Couples used written contracts when a
clergyman was not available, allowing for the marriage to commence
and the ceremony to occur later.73 In some cases, even if the ceremony
never occurred, the marriage could be considered valid.74 A written
contract was at the heart of the most notorious California common-
law marriage case, Sharon v. Sharon.75
In 1872, the Legislature codified California law regarding common-
law marriage. 71 Civil Code § 55 defined marriage as a "civil contract"
by parties with capacity to consent.77 Consent was necessary but not
sufficient to constitute a marriage.78 Consent had to be followed by
either "a solemnization" or "by a mutual assumption of marital rights,
duties, or obligations."79 Thus, in California, common-law marriage
took the form of a contract followed by the "mutual assumption of
marital rights, duties, or obligations.""°
68. 2 Cal. 503, 506-07 (Cal. 1852).
69. Id. at 506.
70. Id. Isaac and Tillatha's marriage was bigamous and thus illegal and void because
Isaac was still married to a prior wife at the time he "married" Tillatha. See HENDRIK
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 87-90 (2000).
71. Graham, 2 Cal. at 506.
72. The contract in the Graham case was entered into in September 1845, prior to
California statehood. Id. at 503; HITrELL, supra note 67, at 387. The court noted that the
marriage was "according to the laws of the land, which were then the laws of Mexico."
Graham, 2 Cal. at 503.
73. Hans W. Baade, The Form of Marriage in Spanish North America, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 8 (1975).
74. This type of marriage was called "marriage by bond" in pre-statehood Texas and
even dubious marriages were considered valid to prevent the "scandal of manifestly
illegal cohabitation." Id. at 8-9. In the Graham case, Isaac had come from Texas to
California and later admitted that he had a wife living in Texas. Graham, 2 Cal. at 504.
Thus he possibly was well acquainted with the custom that a written contract could be
sufficient to establish a marriage even without the presence of a clergyman. See Baade,
supra note 73, at 8.
75. Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888).
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 55 (1872).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 55 (1872).
78. Id.
79. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 873 (Cal. 1897).
80. Id.
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1. The Most Notorious Case
The most notorious California common-law marriage case in-
volved wealthy Senator William Sharon and Sarah Althea Hill."1 The
case began in 1883 and captivated the public until the legal skirmish-
ing ended in 1890.82 It involved some of the most prominent men of
the time, including United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen
J. Field. 3 The entire story has been the subject of two books," and a
history of San Francisco would be incomplete without reference to
the case. 5
William Sharon came to California in the Gold Rush in 1849.6
He became extremely wealthy, primarily through investment in silver
mining in Nevada.87 His fortune was estimated between twenty and
thirty million dollars.' When his partner William C. Ralston died, he
ended up owning the Grand Hotel and the Palace Hotel as well.89 By
the year 1875, he was known as the "Bonanza King" and "King of the
Comstock" and was elected to the post of United States Senator from
Nevada." Despite his senatorial responsibilities, he spent most of his
time in San Francisco and was not reelected to a second term.91
Sharon's wife died in 1875 when he was fifty-four.92 "Loath to give
up the pleasures of feminine companionship, the Senator, by his own
later account, began employing young women on a monthly salary,
requiring only that they make themselves readily available and that
they be discreet."93 Even in a city where brothels were common,
94
Sharon's "penchant for harlots would poison his old age, and even
after his death would make his name a local byword for the pruri-
ent."9" Sarah Althea Hill was one of these young women.96 The
81. Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888).
82. ROBERT H. KRONINGER, SARAH AND THE SENATOR 12 (1964).
83. See 3DICTIONARYOFAMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 372-73 (Allen Johnson et al. eds., 1958);
KRONINGER, supra note 82 at 127.
84. KRONINGER, supra note 82; GOULD, supra note 17.
85. JuLiAALTRoCCHI, THE SPECTACULAR SAN FRANCISCANS 223-24 (1949); OSCARLEWIS
& CARROLL D. HALL, BONANZA INN 123-24 (1939); DORIS MUSCATINE, OLD SAN FRANCISCO
298-99 (1975).
86. GOULD, supra note 17, at 169.
87. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 15-16.
88. Id. at 18.
89. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 18.
90. GOULD, supra note 84, at 169-70.
91. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 17.
92. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 18.
93. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 19.
94. STEPHEN LONGSTREET, THE WILDER SHORE, A GALA SOCIAL HISTORY OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S SINNERS AND SPENDERS, 1849-1906, at 226-28 (1968).
95. GOULD, supra note 17, at 169.
96. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 298.
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"Senator had set Sarah up in a lavish apartment in the Grand Hotel
from which she could cross to his Palace Hotel apartment by the con-
necting bridge over Market Street."97 Sarah also received five hundred
dollars a month for "expenses."98 Sarah, however, was not discreet.9
Their relationship ended in 1881,100 and the legal skirmishing
began when Sarah had Sharon arrested in 1883 on charges of adul-
tery.'0 ' In response, Sharon filed a case in federal court against Sarah
to declare that he had never been married to her.' The criminal
charge was eventually dismissed, but Sarah's attorney instead pur-
sued a civil suit against Sharon for divorce, seeking alimony and her
share of community property. °3 The major issue was whether they
were married. 104 Sarah's claim was based on a written marriage con-
tract. 10 5 At the time, California Civil Code § 55 provided:
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to
which the consent of the parties capable of making it is necessary.
Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed
by a solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights,
duties, or obligations. 06
Much of the litigation concerned whether the marriage contract was
genuine and whether they had a "mutual assumption of marital
rights, duties, or obligations."'0 7
The publicity around the case came fast and furious. Sarah was
dubbed the "Rose of Sharon,"'0' but little was known about her. Some
facts emerged immediately: "[a]ll agreed that she was vivacious,
quick-witted, headstrong, and uncommonly pretty."'0 9 She came to
San Francisco from Missouri in 1870.110 She was an orphan whose
97. Id. at 298. How the couple met and established their relationship was of prime
interest in the trial of Sharon v. Sharon. See GOULD, supra note 17, at 221-22, 245-46;
KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 53-55; LEWIS & HALL, supra note 85, at 123-24.
98. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 298.
99. GOULD, supra note 17, at 169.
100. KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 58-59.
101. Id. at 15-19.
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 25-26; Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888).
104. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 298.
105. Id.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE §55 (1872).
107. Id.
108. This title is a Biblical reference: ' I am the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valleys.
As the rose among the thorns, so is my love among the daughters." SONGS OF SOLOMON
2:1-2 (KING JAMES).
109. LEWIS & HALL, supra note 85, at 121.
110. Id. at 123.
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parents had died when she was a child.11' There were reports that
her father had left his children a handsome estate,"2 but how much
was left when she came to San Francisco with her brother is un-
clear." 3 She lived first with some relatives but later moved to a board-
inghouse and then to a modest room at the Baldwin Hotel. 1 4 Exactly
how old she was when she "married" Senator Sharon is unclear."1
5
The press reported that she was twenty-seven,"' but she was more
likely between thirty and thirty-five." 7
After a sensational trial in 1884,118 the trial court accepted the
written marriage contract as genuine and found Sarah to be Sharon's
wife." 9 She was awarded alimony and a division of the community
property. 120 The decision was immediately appealed. 121 The major re-
sult was that the California Supreme Court stayed the order for ali-
mony until all the appeals were resolved. 122 In 1885, while the case
was on appeal, Sharon died.123 The litigation, however, had a life of its
own. In 1888, the California Supreme Court concluded that the stat-
utory requirements of "mutual assumption of marital rights and
duties" were met even though the marriage was not made public
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 24
That was not the end of the case. The case filed in federal court
came to the opposite conclusion concerning the Sharon "mar-
riage.'' 2' The court found that the contract was "false, fabricated,
111. Id. at 122.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 121-22.
114. LEWIS & HALL, supra note 85, at 121-23. The boardinghouse was run by Mammy
Pleasant, "the flamboyant queen of San Francisco's Negro community," who maintained
a "boardinghouse-bordello." GOULD, supra note 17, at 186. Some have suggested that
Mammy was the one behind the plan to claim that Sarah was Sharon's wife. Id. at 190-
93. That Mammy was the one who financed Sarah's litigation against the Senator is
clear. Id. at 272-73.
115. Id. at 186.
116. LEWIS & HALL, supra note 85, at 125.
117. Id. at 121; GOULD, supra note 17, at 186.
118. For details of the trial see GOULD, supra note 17, at 205-56; KRONINGER, supra
note 82, at 125-76.
119. Sharon v. Sharon, 9 P. 187 (Cal. 1885).
120. The trial court awarded alimony in the amount of two thousand five hundred
dollars per month and counsel fees totaling fifty-five thousand dollars. Sharon v. Sharon,
9 P. 187, 188 (Cal. 1885).
121. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 299.
122. Sharon v. Sharon, 7 P. 456, 465 (Cal. 1885). Wrangling over the appeal process
continued until the marriage was affirmed in 1888. 7 P. 456 (Cal. 1885); 8 P. 614 (Cal.
1885); 9 P. 187 (Cal. 1885); 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888).
123. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 299.
124. Sharon, 16 P. at 361.
125. Id.
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forged, fraudulent, and utterly null and void."' 26 Furthermore, the
court enjoined Sarah from relying on that contract in any way. 127
The California Supreme Court therefore reversed itself and consid-
ered that the judgment in favor of Sarah would violate the federal
court injunction. 12 Ultimately, Sarah Althea Hill failed in her at-
tempt to be declared William Sharon's wife.'29 The aftermath of the
case brought additional tragedy and notoriety. Sarah had married one
of her attorneys, David Terry. 3 ° In dramatic circumstances, Terry
was shot by the bodyguard of Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field.''
Justice Field was one of the judges who upheld the federal trial court
judgment and his involvement inflamed a feud between Terry and
Field.132 In 1892, Sarah was committed to the Stockton State Hospital
for the Insane where she remained until she died in 1937.133
There is no question that the Sharon-Hill case garnered enor-
mous attention from the public. The case gained additional notoriety
from the involvement of so many prominent lawyers and jurists in
its denouement. Unquestionably it was an impetus to reconsider the
California law regarding common-law marriage. The court opinions
also illuminate the then current concepts of how husbands and wives
acted toward one another. 134 In considering the Sharon-Hill relation-
ship, the California Supreme Court noted that the couple did not have
a common home or place of abode.13 Even more telling was the fact
126. Terry v. Sharon, 131 U.S. 40, 41 (1889).
127. Sharon v. Sharon, 23 P. 1100, 1101 (1890).
128. Terry v. Sharon, 131 U.S. 40, 41 (1889).
129. MUSCATINE, supra note 85, at 300.
130. Id. at 299.
131. Id. at 300.
132. See id. at 299-301 for a synopsis of the aftermath. For a more extensive expla-
nation, see GOULD, supra note 17, at 293-337; KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 196-246.
Field was embroiled in personal rivalries. The most famous of these involved
Judge David Terry, who had sat on the state supreme court with Field in
the late 1850s and early 1860s. Terry represented and then married Sarah
Althea Hill, who claimed to be the widow of Senator William Sharon. When
lawsuits to obtain control of Sharon's vast fortune reached the federal court,
Field ruled against Terry and Hill. In the courtroom Terry and Hill became
violent and threatened Field, and Terry was jailed for contempt of court. In
the summer of 1889 federal officials appointed David Neagle as Field's body-
guard. When Field and Terry met by chance in a California railroad station,
Neagle shot and killed Terry. There was considerable doubt whether Terry
had been threatening Field in any way. Neagle was imprisoned, but released
when federal officials, claiming he was a federal official carrying out his duty
asked the federal circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the circuit court decision in Cunningham v. Neagle (1890).
7 AMERICAN NAT'L BIOGRAPHY 895-96 (1999).
133. GOULD, supra note 17, at 333-37; KRONINGER, supra note 82, at 239-46; MUSCATINE,
supra note 85, at 300-01.
134. Sharon v. Sharon, 22 P. 26, 37-38 (Cal. 1889).
135. Id. at 37.
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that they "held themselves out to their relatives, friends, acquain-
tances, and the world as unmarried."'36 In addition, Sarah "never at
any time assumed the name of her alleged husband.' 37 In their
personal correspondence, there were "no words of affection or en-
dearment, nothing that one might expect to find in communications
between husband and wife."'38 In assessing the letters between the
couple, Judge Deady in the federal court opinion, viewed them as
"utterly void of affection, and altogether lacking in mention or even
allusion to the numberless and nameless little incidents and affairs
peculiar to every married couple, and which taken together, consti-
tute the charm as well as the staple of married life. . . ."1" He also
found it significant that "it does not appear that she ever received
a present, greeting, or other token or affection from [Sharon]."14° In
sum, conduct indicative of a common-law marriage includes (1) co-
habitation in a "common home," (2) holding out to the "world" that
the couple is married, (3) the wife taking her husband's name, and
(4) the relation being one of affection between the couple.
2. Spotlight on Two Cases - Blythe and White
The plethora of common-law marriage cases continued with
another highly publicized case concerning Thomas H. Blythe and
Alice Edith.' 4 1 The case bore remarkable similarity to the Sharon-
Hill litigation. Thomas Blythe, an elderly and wealthy man,'42 was
involved with a young woman, 14 Alice Edith Dickason. After he died
in 1883, she claimed to be his widow based on the common-law mar-
riage provisions of the California statute. 144 Just as in the Sharon
case, the issue was whether Alice was his wife or his mistress.45 Her
right to take her share of the community property hinged on the reso-
lution of that issue. The result was the same: Thomas and Alice Edith
were not married because "she did cohabit with him as his mistress,
and in no other character or capacity.' 46
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 37-38.
139. Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337, 373 (1885).
140. Id.
141. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735 (Cal. 1895).
142. The San Francisco Chronicle reported Blythe's estate to be around four million
dollars. Blythe's Widows, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 1883, at 4.
143. According to her testimony, Edith Alice was twenty-three years old when she first
met Blythe in May, 1878. Mrs. Alice Edith, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23, 1890, at 8.
144. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735, 736 (1895).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The Sharon v. Hill case differed in some respects from
Hinckley.'47 Hinckley did not involve a written agreement as did
the Sharon case.14 The facts were more sympathetic to Alice Edith
than to Sarah Althea.'49 For instance, Blythe and Alice Edith had
lived together at Blythe's home from April of 1880 to his death in
April of 1883, even though they had "meretricious intercourse" for
about two years before she moved into his home. 5 ° The California
Supreme Court, in noting the import of the marriage issue, viewed
Alice Edith with some compassion for her situation:
For if she was not his wife, then notwithstanding the fact that
she gave to him the best years of her life, and appears to have
contributed more to his comfort and happiness than any other
person mentioned in record, she will be left without a dollar of
his vast estate.15 1
Although some facts favored Alice Edith, it was unmistakable that
when she met Blythe she was a woman who needed financial sup-
port.'52 Alice Edith had been divorced, made several "unsuccessful
attempts to earn a living by teaching art and music," and needed to
seek "assistance from various relatives.' 1 53 At the trial, she testified
that she had left her husband partly because he was a poor man.'54
When challenged that she "wanted to take [Blythe] in because he was
a rich bachelor," she replied, "I laid no wiles for Mr. Blythe."' 5
Despite the fact that Blythe was deceased and could not contra-
dict Alice Edith's testimony, she was quite candid that their relation-
ship was not a chaste courtship that ended at the altar.'56 Defense
Counsel Foote 5' elicited answers about the initiation of their relation-
ship with Alice Edith testifying about Blythe chasing her around the
parlor and dining room of his home and catching her and kissing
her.'58 Another incident involved another chase and tearing at her
147. Id.
148. Id. at 735; Sharon, 22 P. At 29.
149. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735, 736 (Cal. 1895).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mrs. Alice Edith, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23, 1890, at 8.
153. Id.
154. Burning Kisses, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5, 1890, at 8.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. W.W. Foote "was known as the bulldog of the bar, being tenacious and even over-
bearing with witnesses in cross-examination .... " HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF
CALIFORNIA 189 (J.C. Bates ed., 1912). During the last ten or twelve years of his life, he
amassed a fortune. Id. "His fee in the Blythe will case was in itself enough to make him
independent." Id.
158. Burning Kisses, supra note 154, at 8.
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bodice." 9 Foote intimated that Blythe proposed that she "should live
with him, but not as his wife."'" Alice Edith admitted that Blythe had
a key to her room.161 She was challenged with the following:
"Didn't you think it somewhat strange that he should have a key
to your room before you regarded one another as husband and
wife?" asked Mr. Foote, looking at Alice Edith as though he gravely
doubted her to have been "chaste as the icicle that's curdled by
the frost from purest snow, and hangs on Dian's temple." '162
Alice Edith described their wedding ceremony that occurred after she
had resisted attempts by Blythe to caress and kiss her:
He told me to place my hand in his and asked me if I would re-
nounce my hopes, give up all my friends, love, cherish and accept
him as my husband, take care of him and be a faithful and de-
voted wife and live with him until death parted us. I told him I
would. I asked him what he would do for me and he said that he
would be a faithful and devoted husband and care for and pro-
tect me in sickness and in health as long as he lived. He said
'Amen' and I said the same.'63
Blythe also insisted that she keep the marriage secret and live sep-
arately until he was able to settle some "trouble" he was having with
his then mistress." With only her testimony to support the marriage
agreement the focus moved to whether from the time she moved to
his home, they had mutually assumed the rights, duties, or obliga-
tions of marriage.'65
Much of the testimony focused on how Alice Edith was addressed.
Was she 'Mrs. Blythe" or was she "Alice Dickason"?"6' Many of the
witnesses for Alice Edith were tradespeople and servants who ad-
dressed her as Mrs. Blythe:
A long line of witnesses still comes daily trooping in to the hearing
of the Blythe case, each bringing a little evidence that Alice Edith
was known as Mrs. Blythe, had goods charged to Mrs. Blythe, and
159. Id.
160. A Tell-Tale Key, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 1890, at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Blythe's Wedding, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 1890, at 5.
164. Id. The mistress was named Nellie Firman, who was also mentioned as a potential
"widow" of Thomas Blythe. Blythe's Widows, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 1883, at 4.
165. Id.
166. Blythe at Home, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 1890, at 5.
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in and out of the cozy rooms which were her home for several
years acted the part of a real wife."87
The more probative evidence came from those who knew Thomas
Blythe.168 All testified that Blythe referred to her as "Miss Dickason"
or "my niece."'69 Thomas Blythe was quite open about his relation-
ship with Alice Edith. For instance, he confided in one Frederick R.
Reed, a surveyor who had been employed by Blythe and had accom-
panied him on a trip.' Blythe had freely discussed his experiences
with women. 7' Reed had commented on Alice Edith's paintings and
asked if she was his daughter.'72 "He replied, 'No... Allie,' he said,
'is Miss Alice Dickason, my mistress.""73 The most outstanding wit-
ness was General Andrade, who visited Blythe often and lived at his
home for three months during 1882.' He testified that "he always
knew her as Miss Dickason, and not as Mrs. Blythe; and that Blythe
called her 'Alice,' or 'dear Alice,' or 'my child,' and that he heard him
introduce her as 'Miss Dickason, my niece."""
What the Supreme Court found most striking about the evidence
was "the wonderful dearth of lady visitors at the residence of the de-
ceased [Blythe] and appellant [Alice Edith]."176 The Court speculated
that even a married woman living in humble surroundings would
have "some friends and visitors of her own sex. Entire isolation from
such visitors is exceptional in the highest degree."'77 Such isolation
could only be understood if she were simply his mistress, for
167. Blythe at Home, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 16, 1890, at 3, col. 5.
168. Id.
169. Blythe's factotum, Leobeus H. Varney, testified:
"By what names did you hear Blythe address the lady?" asked the cross-
examiner.
"I heard him call her 'Alice,' "Miss Dickason' and 'his niece."
"Did you ever hear him call her 'my dear?"'
"No, sir."
"Or 'my love?"'
"No, sir. I never heard any lallygagging of that kind," responded the old
gentleman, biting his lip and moving uneasily in his chair.
Blythe's Gout, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 1890, at 5, col. 7.
170. Blythe's Mistresses, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 19, 1890, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Another of Blythe's friends, Milo Jeffers, testified that Alice Edith was referred
to at lunch with another friend as Miss Dickason. Witness Jeffers, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 20,
1890, at 5. Jeffers later asked Blythe if he intended to marry Alice. Id. Blythe responded,
"No, but I will make her my legal niece." Id. On cross examination, when questioned on
why he asked Blythe about marriage, Jeffers answered, "Well, he seemed always to be
polite and attentive to her." Id.
174. Blythe's Mistresses, supra note 170, at 5.
175. Hinckley v. Ayres, 38 P. 735, 737 (Cal. 1895). Several other witnesses testified
similarly. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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if the relations between them had been reputed to be that of mar-
riage, it is difficult to imagine why she did not have a number of
respectable women among her associates and visitors. But, prac-
tically, she had none after she commenced to live openly with the
deceased at his house.
178
Two other aspects of the case were devastating to Alice Edith's
claim. 179 The first were her letters to Blythe where she addressed
him as "Uncle" and signed them as "Niece."18 That evidence under-
mined her testimony that she was actually his wife. Her explanation
that Blythe demanded secrecy was not plausible.' The second as-
pect was a finding that Blythe's heir was his illegitimate daughter
Florence.'82 Thus the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's finding that '"Thomas H. Blythe was never married to [Alice
Edith] ... but that for a certain period before his death she did co-
habit with him as his mistress, and in no other character or capac-
ity."'8 3 Again, this case portrays a young woman claiming to be the
wife of a wealthy and prominent man but failing to prove that they
had mutually assumed marital rights, duties, or obligations. They
did not treat each other in the usual way of married people nor did
they "conduct themselves as to have full repute among their intimate
friends and associates to be husband and wife."'"
Of all the common-law marriage cases prior to 1895, White v.
White' stands out. It is the only California Supreme Court case up-
holding a divorce judgment based on a common-law marriage." The
husband Lorenzo denied that he was actually married to Jane. His
argument was that "during the whole period of the cohabitation" they
were "man and mistress.' 18 7 Even though their cohabitation had begun
with "illicit intercourse,"'"m the facts found by the trial court clearly
178. Id.
179. Id. at 739; Blythe v. Ayres 31 P. 915, 915-16 (Cal. 1892).
180. Hinckley, 38 P. at 738.
181. Id. at 739.
182. Florence Blythe, born in 1873, was declared the child of Thomas Blythe and his
lawful heir. Blythe v. Ayres, 31 P. 915, 915-16 (Cal. 1892). She was thus entitled to receive
his estate. Id.
183. Hinckley, 38 P. at 736.
184. Id.
185. 29 P. 276 (Cal. 1890).
186. Id. Two other California Supreme Court cases favored women trying to establish
a common-law marriage: In re McCausland's Estate, 52 Cal. 568, 1878 WL 1483 (Cal. 1878)
(addressing claims of a widow seeking family allowance from her common-law husband's
estate) and In re Ruffino's Estate, 48 P. 127 (Cal. 1897) (involving heirs contesting naming
common-law wife as sole beneficiary of decedent's will).
187. White, 29 P. at 276.
188. Id.
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favored Jane."8 9 Jane was a young widow, only twenty or twenty-one,
with an infant of tender age, when she arrived in California from
Australia in May 1850.1' She met Lorenzo, who was around her age,
in July of 1850 in San Francisco.191 He hired her as a housekeeper at
Rancho San Geronimo in Marin County for one hundred dollars a
month.192 The ranch house was small, with only two rooms and their
illicit intercourse commenced very quickly after Jane arrived at the
ranch. 19
3
Jane had a child the next year, followed by another child in
1853.194 Two more children were born in 1856 and 1859.' They con-
tinued to live together until Lorenzo "quit living with" her in 1882.1'
The trial court found that Lorenzo and Jane mutually agreed to marry
after the first child was born and after that time lived and cohabited
as "husband and wife." '197 Their agreement, according to the trial
court, could be inferred from "cohabitation and repute sufficient to
establish a marriage."'98 The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence
in detail and concluded that "[t]here is evidence here, at least since
1861, of cohabitation and repute which tends to show a marriage be-
tween the parties."199
What was that evidence? The evidence focused on the terms that
Lorenzo used to refer to Jane such as "the madam.'2 °° Lorenzo's par-
ents and sister testified that they "supposed" Jane was his wife when
he introduced her as "the madam."2o' Once the couple moved to Albion
in 1861, many witnesses testified that they were known as Mr. and
Mrs. White." 2 One said that they "acted towards each other as hus-
band and wife."2 3 Another said that "they behaved towards each
other as any other man and wife behaved."' 4 Another "judged from
189. Id.
190. Damaging to her claim was the fact that she began having sexual relations with
Lorenzo soon after being hired as a housekeeper. Id. at 276. She possibly was desperate
to support herself and her child in San Francisco and was willing to move in with Lorenzo.
See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 90 (2000).
191. White v. White, 29 P. 276, 276, 280 (Cal. 1890).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 280.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 277.
196. Id. at 280.
197. White, 29 P. at 276.
198. Id. at 277.
199. Id. at 282.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 281.
203. White, 29 P. at 281.
204. Id. at 280-81.
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their conversation that they were man and wife. 2 5 Their relation-
ship clearly met the criteria articulated in the Sharon201 case. Not
only did Jane and Lorenzo cohabit in a common home from 1850 to
1882, they held themselves out to relatives, friends, and visitors as
husband and wife.20 7 Although not mentioned specifically by the
California Supreme Court, the length of their relationship and the
presence of their four children were undoubtedly indicia of the
"affection" and "the numberless little incidents and affairs peculiar
to every married couple. 208
Even such a sympathetic case provoked a dissent.20 9 Judge Works
viewed their relationship as "not only.., illicit in the beginning, but
that it continued to be so up to the time of their separation.'21 °
Without a promise or an agreement to marry or to live together as
husband and wife, Judge Works was unwilling to recognize their
211Frhm 212marriage.' For him, cohabitation and repute were insufficient.
3. Common-Law Marriage, Bigamy, and Adultery
The attitude toward common-law marriage in California and its
abolition was also influenced by cases involving bigamy and adul-
tery.21 3 In these cases, young people began to live together without
the benefit of a license or solemnization.2 4 Often a pregnancy led to
the "marriage.21 5 When the husband was later accused of bigamy or
adultery, the "marriage" was called into question.21 '6 As Civil Code
§ 55 validated marriages where there was "a mutual assumption of
marital rights, duties or obligations," the issue was whether there
was a "first" marriage or a marriage at all.217 If there was no first
marriage, the criminal charge of bigamy would be dismissed. If there
was no marriage at all, there could be no adultery.
In August 1893, the California Supreme Court faced an ap-
peal of a bigamy conviction against John Beevers. 18 When Beevers
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207. See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
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married Clara Bates, he was prosecuted for bigamy.219 According
to the prosecution, he was still married to a young woman named
Lou.22 ° The trial court accepted the facts that when John was twenty
years old and Lou only fourteen years old, they eloped, "with a view
to escape the difficulties to marriage presented by the girl's tender
years."22' In accordance with the requirements of common-law mar-
riage, they agreed to be married and returned home and lived to-
gether as husband and wife, were reputed to be married people, and
conducted themselves as such.222 They lived together for almost four
years and had a child together.223 Soon after they separated, John
married Clara.224 The trial court had admitted evidence of Lou and
John's divorce as evidence of their marriage.22
The court faced a difficult dilemma. It likely did not want to de-
clare the first marriage to be invalid, thus ruining Lou's reputation
in addition to rendering the child illegitimate, but if the marriage was
valid, then John's bigamy conviction would stand. The court chose to
solve the problem based on an error in evidence.226 It declared that
the evidence of John and Lou's divorce was erroneously admitted in
the bigamy trial and prejudiced the jury.227 The court noted that ap-
plying the principle of estoppel in a criminal case was a "wholesome
rule" protecting "the interests of the wronged spouse, the unfortunate
offspring, and good morals.... "228 In this way, the court could con-
sider both the first and second marriages valid, and John Beevers
would probably be acquitted in a new trial.
On the issue of common-law marriage, the court reluctantly rec-
ognized that a marriage did exist between John and Lou.229 Even
though the Court stated that common-law marriage "is not for the
court to support or condemn," the Court speculated
It is known to all that it is becoming a common practice with the
people, entirely too common, but if bigamy, adultery, and kindred
crimes cannot be founded upon such marriages, inducements are
offered to the lawless which cannot fail to be seized upon, and
which will undoubtedly end in most pernicious results.23 °
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In direct language, the court condemned informal marriage
where older men could take advantage of young women with im-
punity by leaving a relationship without the specter of being held to
the responsibilities of marriage. The legislature was soon to take a
cue from the California Supreme Court and not only condemn but
abolish common-law marriage.
B. The Legislature Moves to Abolish Common-Law Marriage
Legislation to abolish California's version of common-law mar-
riage was introduced in 1891 but not enacted until 1895.231 The bill
introduced in the 1891 legislative session was described as a "very
good bill" and if passed "the recent contract system [would] be at an
end in California." '232 That very good bill received little attention as
the legislature worked on other bills giving rights to women. Two
bills passed: one authorizing the appointment of women as notaries
public2 3 and another giving married women the right to consent to
their husband's gifts of community property.23
4
Soon after the Legislature adjourned that year, the Supreme
Court rendered another decision regarding a claim of common-law
marriage. In that case, Kilburn v. Kilburn,3 5 Minnie sued Cleon for
divorce based on adultery after he had married Nellie Rowe in a cere-
monial marriage.236 A jury found that Minnie and Cleon had met the
requirements for a contract marriage and had mutually assumed
marital rights, duties, and obligations.237 The contract was actually
a secret one, entered into soon after Minnie gave birth to a child
about nine months after their "acquaintance ripened into an act of
illicit intercourse, followed by similar acts at opportune times ....
Despite the contract, the marriage failed on the "mutual assumption"
requirement.239 The major problems were that the couple never lived
231. At that time, the California Legislature met every other year from January until
the end of March. E. DOTSON WILSON & BRIAN EBBERT, CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATURE 73
(2006), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov.pdf/Ch_06_CaLegi06.pdf. Therefore, the legislation was
introduced in 1891 and 1893, then passed in the 1895 legislative session. Id.
232. Bills and Bills, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 15, 1891, at 1 (discussing Assem. 169,
29th Sess. (Ca. 1891)).
233. Assem. 52, 29th Sess. (Ca. 1891).
234. S. 120, 29th Sess. (Ca. 1891); see also Charlotte K. Goldberg, A Cauldron of Anger:
the Spreckels Family and Reform of California Community Property Law, 12 W. LEGAL
HIST. 241, 242-45 (1999).
235. Kilburn v. Kilburn, 26 P. 636 (Cal. 1891); Marriage Contracts, S.F. CHRON., May
8, 1891, at 5.
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together in the same house, they never were reputed to be husband
and wife in their respective communities, and Cleon had contributed
only about seventy dollars to support Minnie and her child.2 4' The
Court considered cohabitation, "to live or dwell together; to have the
same habitation, so that where one lives and dwells there does the
other live and dwell also," as the threshold requirement for "mutual
assumption" accompanying a contract marriage.24' Thus, Minnie's di-
vorce action failed because there was no marriage at all. It is unclear
whether Minnie's motive in the divorce was to assure that her child
was legitimate or was a vengeful act because Cleon had married
Nellie Rowe in a ceremonial marriage.2 42 The San Francisco Chroni-
cle, however, viewed it as a case where "[t]he Supreme Court has de-
stroyed the validity of another alleged marriage contract, and another
wealthy citizen of the State has secured a stronger hold upon much
of his money." '243 Thus, Minnie Kilburn was viewed by the press as an
adventuress, pursuing a wealthy man for his money, basing her claim
on California's version of common-law marriage.244 The abolition issue
awaited the next legislative session which began in January, 1893.
In the 1893 legislative session, another bill to abolish common-
law marriage was introduced.245 It garnered more attention and de-
bate than in the prior session but the bill ultimately failed.246 An edi-
torial published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal advocated passage
of the bill, noting that the days had passed "when ranchers were two
and three days' journey from a magistrate or a minister" and young
people could "take each other for husband and wife by the simple
formality of mutual consent. 2 47 The editorial continued that "the rec-
ognition of consent marriage at the present day merely opens a door
for the schemes of adventuresses. '248 Of course, the editorial primar-
ily alluded to the adventuress Sarah Althea, so well known from the
well-publicized Sharon case.2 49 Also the more recent Kilburn25 ° case
brought more publicity to the issue of women seeking monetary
reward from an informal relationship.
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The editorial also opined that society should be involved in the
serious matter of marriage."' For a man, marriage "converts him
from a waif and estray into a responsible member of the commu-
nity. 25 2 For a woman, "her whole life's happiness depends on her en-
tering into the marriage state under proper conditions." '253 Therefore,
"[p]ublic interest requires that a young couple seeking to become man
and wife should be made to feel how grave a business they are under-
taking by being confronted with a magistrate." '254 Here, the editorial
was possibly alluding to "mock marriage ceremonies" that "placed
people in very annoying predicaments on more than one occasion."25
One such predicament was reported to have occurred because of some
young people's summer amusement at a farm in Los Gatos.2"6 One
summer evening young people paired off to have the amusement of
mock marriages.257 Among the couples was Samuel Beggs and Miss
Ethel Knowlton.25 The couples were to "marry," but no "minister" was
available to perform the ceremony.259 Instead it was suggested that
they all "marry by contract."26 Pen and paper were produced and
an agreement to love, honor, and obey was signed and witnessed by
the couples.261 After the mock wedding, it was treated as a "royally
good joke," but it seems that the Beggs-Knowlton written agreement
was not torn up or burned.262 Miss Knowlton kept the contract, and
Mr. Beggs had to resort to the courts to nullify it.263 With the abo-
lition of contract marriages, that "piece of youthful folly" could not
happen again.2"
The debate on the Senate Bill was heated: "[a]ll the speakers
used the Sharon case as a horrible example to illustrate both sides
of the discussion." '265 Those in favor of the bill saw that abolishing
common-law marriage "would prevent the evil at its source." '266 Those
against the bill thought that "it would work a hardship on poor, de-
luded women." '267 Protection of poor, deluded women carried the day,
251. On Marriage, supra note 243, at 1.
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and the bill was defeated twenty-five in favor and forty against.268
Abolition of common-law marriage would again have to await the
next legislative session.
The scheme of another so-called adventuress, Alice Edith, was
in the limelight at the start of the legislative session in January of
1895.269 On January 2, the Blythe case was finally decided by the
California Supreme Court.270 The entire trial concerning Thomas
Blythe's marriage to Alice Edith Dickason had grabbed the atten-
tion of the public from January to April of 1890, and again when the
California Supreme Court rendered its decision on January 2, 1895
that "ALICE EDITH LOSES. She Was Never Married to Blythe." '271
Soon after that decision, bills were introduced in the Senate and the
Assembly. 2 2 After the positive recommendation by the Assembly
Judiciary Committee, the bills passed unanimously in both houses.273
Why the bill abolishing common-law marriage passed with such ease
when it had been defeated in the past session is unclear. Perhaps pro-
tection of "poor, deluded women" now favored abolition. Alice Edith's
case was certainly a more sympathetic one than Sarah Althea's. 4
In the choice of protecting Thomas Blythe's young illegitimate child
or Alice Edith who had taken care of him at the end of his life, the
California Supreme Court favored the child and Alice Edith was de-
nied the benefits of being his widow.275 The press noted that "[m] any
girls ... will have to be taught the new law in order to prevent them
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from being lured into marriages that will be legally worthless." '276 Also,
after passage of the bill, "[n]o more can young people under age run
away from home and return to their respective homes a week later
with the announcement that they have married by contract.""27 Thus,
common-law marriage, which led to several notorious cases and the
issue of questionable marriages, was abolished in California in 1895.
C. Post-Abolition Cases
1. The First Test - Norman v. Norman
The first test of the new legislation arose when a father tried to
thwart the marriage of his young daughter to an older man.7 The
father was A.C. Thomson, "one of the wealthiest orange growers
in Southern California" '279 and "the original cultivator of the famous
Thompson [sic] navel orange."2" His daughter Janette was the young-
est of six daughters2 ' and was almost sixteen years old.282 Homer
Norman, who was almost twenty-five years old, was employed by the
Duarte-Monrovia Fruit Exchange and had known Janette for near-
ly a year.28 Janette's parents did not disguise their disapproval of
Homer's attention to Janette, particularly because of her "tenderage.,284
On the evening of August 1, 1897, the couple eloped. 28 About
8:30 that evening, Janette disappeared from home and left behind
a note stating that she had decided "to put in the remainder of her
276. Unmarried Women Should Beware, S.F. CALL, Mar. 21, 1895, at 4. This article
stated:
Every girl and every girl's mother in California should read Assembly bill
567. It abolishes all common-law marriages and young girls and middle-
aged women who have been married by contract, and who have not recorded
the document, should do so at once, otherwise the instrument is not worth
the paper it is written on.
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279. Are Sea Marriages Legal?, S.F. CALL, Aug. 4, 1897, at 5.
280. Married at Sea, L.A. DAILY TIMES, Aug. 3, 1897, at 12. According to the court
papers, Janette's father was A.C. Thomson, not Thompson. Norman, 54 P. at 143.
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282. Marriages at Sea, L.A. DAILY TIMES, Aug. 16, 1897, at 12.
283. In the court opinion, Homer's age is stated as twenty-one years and ten months.
Norman, 54 P. at 143. However, Homer's complaint states that he is twenty-four years
and ten months. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 4, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143
(Cal. 1897) (No. 469). The first newspaper report also states "Homer Norman is nine years
his bride's senior." Married at Sea, supra note 276, at 12.
284. Married at Sea, supra note 280, at 12.
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life with Homer."2"6 Soon after finding the note, the local police were
notified and an attempt was made to intercept the couple." 7 The
couple eluded their pursuers by taking a carriage to Long Beach.""
There they met Captain Pierson, the captain of the yacht J. Willey.1
9
The Captain, the couple, and witnesses sailed to the High Seas,
around nine miles from the coast.29° There the Captain "pronounced
the words that made the young lovers man and wife." '291 Thomson was
reported to "be very angry over the course taken by... his youngest
daughter," and her mother was "very ill, having been prostrated when
informed of her daughter's elopement." '292
The very next day, August 3, Thomson filed a writ of habeas
corpus in Superior Court in Los Angeles for the return of his daugh-
ter.293 The validity of the marriage was the main issue at the trial
on August 5.294 The L.A. Daily Times reported that Janette was no
longer with Homer and instead was under the care of Sheriff Burr in
San Fernando.295 There she was to remain until the decision regard-
ing the marriage was resolved.296 On August 14, Judge M.T. Allen
rendered his opinion that the marriage was never legally contracted
and, as a minor, her father was entitled to her custody and control.297
The press reported that this decision was a matter of "general
importance" because of the "the large number of sea marriages that
have occurred recently on this coast. ' One can infer that young
people who wished to marry despite parental disapproval would try
to evade the requirements of the 1895 law by going offshore to wed.
Judge Allen noted that:
As a result families have been disgraced, tragedies have been
enacted and estates have been wasted in bitter controversies
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. In the Second Amended Complaint filed by Homer Norman, the vessel was
described as a "fishing and pleasure schooner." Appellant's Points and Authorities at 6,
Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. 1897) (No. 469).
290. Married at Sea, supra note 280, at 12.
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293. Marriages at Sea, supra note 282, at 12.
294. Norman, 54 P. at 143; see Marriages at Sea, L.A. DAILY TIMES, Aug. 15, 1897, at 12.
295. Marriages at Sea, supra note 282, at 12.
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297. Sea Marriages Are Not Legal, S.F. CALL, Aug. 15, 1897, at 7.
298. Id. In the appeal of the Norman case, the defendant argued that "hundreds and
probably thousands of couples in California... have been married at sea. Since and while
this case was pending, many marriages have taken place off Redondo. So universal has
grown the practice that it may be said to have grown into a custom." Appellant's Points
and Authorities at 21, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Nov. 13, 1897) (No. 469).
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ensuing. The Legislature, in amending the marriage law in 1895,
evidently had in view all of these difficulties and sought by one
stroke to define a course of conduct, and no other, which would
result in marriage.299
Clearly the plethora of notorious cases had not been forgotten, and
the Norman case was to join their annals.
Although Thomson thought that his daughter was secure from
Homer, it soon became evident that Homer was not ready to accept
Judge Allen's decision in the habeas corpus proceedings. On August
16, 1897, his lawyer hastily filed a Complaint requesting that "said
marriage be declared valid."3" The complaint was amended twice, add-
ing factual details, and alleged that after the ceremony at sea, Homer
and Janette "began to cohabit and live together as such husband and
wife and continued so to do until the 10th day of August, 1897."31 The
answer filed by Thomson as guardian ad litem for Janette admitted
all the allegations of Homer's Complaint. °2 Thomson's defense was
that the couple married "with the intent and the purpose of evading
the statutes of the state of California prescribing the manner in
which marriages shall be contracted, solemnized and entered into.' 3
Therefore, Thomson argued, the "pretended marriage" should be "de-
clared illegal, null and void, and [Homer] be forever precluded and es-
topped from setting up, asserting or claiming to be the husband of this
defendant.""3 4 The trial was held the next day, and, unsurprisingly,
Judge Allen ruled in favor of Thomson; thus, Homer and Janette
were "not husband and wife."30 5 Homer appealed to the California
Supreme Court.0
Two major points were argued on appeal: (1) the marriage at
sea was valid and should be recognized by the State of California
and (2) the 1895 amendment did not expressly declare marriages at
sea to be void.3"7 Arguing the second point, that despite the 1895
amendment, common-law marriages would still be valid, was ex-
tremely difficult. The major argument was that the 1895 amendment
could not take away the "common law right" unless the legislature
299. Sea Marriages Are Not Legal, supra note 297, at 7.
300. Complaint at 4, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Aug. 16, 1897) (No. 469).
301. Second Amended Complaint, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Sept. 27, 1897)
(No. 469).
302. Answer at 7, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Sept. 28, 1897) (No. 469).
303. Id.
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305. Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 144 (Cal. 1898).
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307. Id.
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had plainly expressed that intention.0 8 The argument focused on
the "very serious ... consequences" that could result from voiding
the Norman marriage and others like it. 3 9 First, many couples, "hun-
dreds and probably thousands," were married at sea. 310 Thus that
type of marriage was so accepted that the practice had ripened into
a custom. 1' Unless the legislature explicitly prohibited those mar-
riages, the courts should consider them valid.312 Second, voiding the
marriage could affect "the married woman's "reputation in the future"
and the legitimacy of any children that "may possibly result from this
union." '313 Admittedly, those arguments were the best arguments that
could be made considering the clarity of the 1895 law and the legis-
lative history leading up to its enactment.
Thomson argued vigorously that the legislature clearly intended
to abolish common-law marriage. " The major points were that "the
necessity for the old common-law marriage had passed away" and
that past litigation "opened the eyes of our legislators to the danger
of longer recognizing or tolerating these loosely formed matrimonial
unions."' 5 The mandatory nature of the statute was found in both the
original statute and its amendment.316 Emphasis was placed on the
word must.317 Although marriage was a contract to which they parties
consented, marriage must be followed by a solemnization according
to the 1895 amendment.318
The argument continued with a "parade of horribles," citing the
notorious cases of the early 1890s with particular attention to the
Sharon and Blythe cases.319 The prior law "left a door open to fraud,
and furnished a temptation to adventurous women and designing and
unscrupulous persons to assent and establish mythical marriages with
a view to defrauding citizens of wealth or their estates and rightful
heirs."32 The conclusion was that the legislature intended "to close
308. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 16-17, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal.
Nov. 13, 1897) (No. 469).
309. Id. at 21.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 22, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Nov.
13, 1897) (No. 469).
314. Respondent's Reply Brief at 6, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Dec. 4, 1897)
(No. 469).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 15.
317. Id. at 6.
318. The prior version of the Civil Code had the additional words "or by mutual
assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations." Id. at 15.
319. Id.
320. Respondent's Reply Brief at 15, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Dec. 4, 1897)
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this door to fraud and to forever and effectually [sic] put an end to this
class of litigation. '32 1 Thus, Thomson urged the supreme court to "con-
strue and declare its provisions to be mandatory and prohibitory." '322
Finally, "[t]o construe the section otherwise would be to defeat the
will and intent of the legislature, and reinstate the old common-law
doctrine with attending litigation and consequent evils. 323
The evils to be combated were twofold. First, the abolition of
common-law marriage was intended to protect a proper wife and
children from "an unscrupulous adventuress who chooses to assert
in our courts an irregular marriage contracted upon the high seas in
the presence of a scalawag captain of a ten-foot fishing dory, or for
that matter, without the presence of any one except the fraudulent
claimant and the dead man., 324 Second, if common-law marriage were
still permitted, "[a]nother great evil that would surely result, would
be irregular marriages contracted with girls of tender years by un-
scrupulous men. 325
The California Supreme Court accepted these arguments.326
Thus, the Norman marriage was invalid because there was no sol-
emnization as required by the 1895 amendment. 327 The court did not
adopt all the hyperbole of the briefs but did state: "[t]o recognize such
a marriage, we think, would grossly violate the spirit and letter of
our statute, and be a blot upon the civilization we profess., 328 The case
ended any attempt to continue the practice of common-law marriage
in California.329
(No. 469).
321. Id. at 16.
322. Id. Norman's reply was to challenge the Respondent's reliance on cases that "are
not applicable and do not support respondent's position." Brief of Appellant in Reply to
Respondent's Reply Brief at 3-4, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Dec. 22, 1897) (No.
469).
323. Respondent's Reply Brief at 3-4, Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. Dec. 4, 1897)
(No. 469).
324. Id. at 31.
325. Id. at 32.
326. Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 146 (Cal. 1898).
327. Id. On the issue of marriages on the high seas, the Court determined that the law
of parties' domicile controlled, especially where there was an attempt to evade those
laws. Id. at 144. The Court referred to the case of Holmes v. Holmes, 12 F. Cas. 405, 412
(Or. 1870) (No. 6638), in which Judge Deady emphasized that "[s]uch an attempt to be
joined in marriage is a fraudulent evasion of the laws to which the citizen of the state is
subject and owes obedience, and ought not to be held valid by them." Norman v. Norman,
54 P. 143, 144-45 (Cal. 1898); see Annotation, Validity of Marriage Celebrated or
Contracted on Board a Vessel, 61 A.L.R. 1528 (1929).
328. Id. at 146.
329. Some cases still arose, such as estate claims raised by the alleged widow or child
of pre-1895 informal marriages. In re Baldwin's Estate, 123 P. 267, 269 (Cal. 1912). These
claims were disfavored, as one court said, "[w]herefore we indulge the not unreasonable
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2. The Narrowing of Cohabitants' Rights
Despite the abolition of common-law marriage in California in
1895, couples still lived together and disputes still arose concerning
property accumulated during their relationship. Cohabitants' theories
for relief, however, were extremely limited. The most influential case
of the early twentieth century regarding cohabitants' rights was
Trutalli v. Meraviglia, decided in 1932.33' If common-law marriage
had still been permitted in California, Charles Trutalli and Rita
Meraviglia would have been considered married. The trial court
found that they "agreed to become and live together and assume the
marital relation between themselves and the world, as husband and
wife." '331 In addition, they had held themselves out as married to their
friends and to the public in general, had two children together, and
continued their relationship for eleven years.332 Charles filed suit to
quiet title to real property located in San Francisco, and Rita cross-
claimed for one-half of that property and other real property in Santa
Clara County.333 The trial court found that they had an agreement
that Rita would perform household services, that any money she
earned Charles would invest for both of them, and each of them would
have an undivided one-half interest of the property held by Charles.3"
Charles challenged the trial court's finding because the contract
was based on "immoral consideration." '335 The California Supreme
Court said that their agreement to cohabit could be separated from
their agreement concerning the property, "so long as such immoral
relation was not made a consideration [for] their agreement. 336 More
importantly, the court upheld the agreement based on Rita's mone-
tary contribution to the property because "the couple agreed to invest
their earnings in property to be held jointly by them., 3 7 Later courts
interpreted these statements narrowly to mean that an implied agree-
ment to share property required a cohabitant to contribute funds to
acquisition of the property.38 The only other way to prove an agree-
ment to share property was to have an express agreement to do so.
a3 9
hope that this case will prove the last of a most malodorous brood." Id.
330. 12 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1932).
331. Id. at 431 (quoting trial court findings).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 430.
334. Id. at 431.
335. Id.
336. Trutalli, 12 P.2d at 431.
337. Id.
338. Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (Cal. 1943).
339. Id.
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That interpretation greatly limited the ability of a cohabitant to
succeed in a claim to share property. When the California Supreme
Court considered the case of Vallera v. Vallera4 ° in 1943, that inter-
pretation had become entrenched. The Vallera 1 facts were less favor-
able to Maria Vallera than the facts of Trutalli 42 to Rita Meraviglia.
Maria claimed property acquired during the one and one-half-year
period they lived together between Concezio's other marriages.343 The
trial court held that all property acquired during that time period was
held by them as tenants-in-common, each having a one-half share.34
Concezio appealed, arguing that there was "no evidence of any
agreement between the parties as to their property rights, and no
evidence concerning the accumulations of property or contributions
by the parties thereto. 345 Clearly his understanding of the Trutalli
case was that sharing of property required either an express agree-
ment or evidence of contribution of funds."' The California Supreme
Court agreed. 7 The relationship alone was insufficient to gain rights
to property:
The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman
living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she
is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone
the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during
the period of their relationship. It has already been answered in
the negative.34
The court reasoned that if a man and a woman who live together as
husband and wife have an agreement to share earnings and accu-
mulations, it will be upheld, but "even in the absence of an express
agreement to that effect, the woman would be entitled to share in the
property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds con-
tributed to its acquisition. 3 49 Thus, the court in Vallera continued
the understanding regarding unmarried cohabitants that the only
340. Id. at 761.
341. Id.
342. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 12 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1932).
343. Vallera, 134 P.2d at 761. In 1933, Maria and Concezio began to live together. Id.
at 762. At that time, he was still married to wife Ethel. Id. That marriage was dissolved
in 1938. Id. One and one-half years later, he married Lido. Id.
344. Id. at 762.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 763.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 762-63 (citing Flanagan v. Capital Natl Bank, 3 P.2d 307, 308 (Cal. 1931)
(stating "the essential basis of recovery is a bona fide belief on the part of the 'wife' on
the existence of a valid marriage")).
349. Vallera, 134 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
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way to prove an implied sharing agreement was through contribu-
tions of funds.
The court in Vallera was split four to three, with a vigorous dis-
sent by Justice Curtis.35° Justice Curtis railed against the narrow
interpretation of an implied agreement:
Unless it can be argued that a woman's services as cook, house-
keeper, and homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that
if, when she contributes money to the purchase of property, her
interest will be protected, then when she contributes her ser-
vices in the home, her interest in property accumulated should
be protected.5'
This view represents both a traditional and a modern view of women's
contributions as homemaker. On the one hand, society traditionally
thinks of a "wife" as being the housekeeper, cook, and homemaker.
The home is her domain and where she belongs. On the other hand,
the modern view is that "wifely" services have value even though
wives are not actually paid wages. The latter idea is clearly the view
reflected in the California Community Property regime that applies
to married people - that each spouse has a "present, existing, and
equal interest" in community property, regardless of their contribu-
tions.352 In Vallera, however, the majority's limited view of implied
contract persisted and proved an unfruitful avenue for recovery un-
less funds were contributed to property.353
350. Id. at 763-64 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 764. The majority opinion was written by Justice Traynor and joined by
Justices Gibson, Shenk, and Edmonds. Id. at 761-63. The dissent included Justice Curtis,
Carter and Peters, pro tern. Id. at 763-64. A contrary view was reflected in the states
following "the common law rule that gave a husband property rights in his wife's labor."
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights
to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2130 (1994). Even though reform movements
gave wives the rights to their earnings, those reforms "often explicitly excluded work a
wife performed for her family ... " Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073,1084
(1994). The majority opinion in Vallera reflected this common-law view of a woman's
contribution to the home. Vallera, 134 P.2d at 764.
352. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 2006).
353. A particularly egregious instance of this narrow reading of contributions to
property is in the case of Keene v. Keene, 371 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1962). In Keene, while the
couple cohabited, Ora Mae had contributed considerable services to Clarence's property
and businesses:
farm labor, including raising of turkeys, chickens, sheep, cattle, the clearing
of land, the sowing, raising and harvesting of grain crops and the growing
and harvesting of nut crops.., operation of his real estate brokerage busi-
ness, furniture business and the buying and selling of real estate, timber
and timber lands.
Id. at 332 n.3. The Court rejected that funds means anything other than "its intended
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3. Attitudes Toward Cohabitation Change
Attitudes toward unmarried relationships and toward women's
roles changed dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s.3"4 Much of
society no longer categorized women by their marital status.355 The
stigma of the "spinster" or "divorcee" started to disappear.356 Women
could enter into a sexual relationship without the fear of pregnancy,
either because of the availability of birth control or abortion.357 The
immorality of living together became a thing of the past.358 It was no
longer as widely viewed as "living in sin."'359 More and more couples
lived together openly without the thought of marriage.36 ° The rele-
vance of marriage to the legitimacy of children also underwent change.
Children born of unmarried couples were no longer as widely stig-
matized as "bastards" or "illegitimate" children.3"' Even more sig-
nificantly, marriage was no longer the only way to create a legal
commonsense meaning" and could not be extended to "services not included in the usual
services of a housekeeper, cook and homemaker." Id. at 333. Equitable remedies also
seemed precluded by the court's statement in Vallera that "[e]quitable considerations
[where there is no genuine belief that she is legally married] are not present in such a
case." Id. at 763. That view was adopted by the courts of appeal in later cases. Oakley
v. Oakley, 185 P.2d 848, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (holding that there could be no equitable
relief unless there was belief in validity of marriage); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 200
P.2d 49, 55-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (finding no existence of a belief in validity of marriage
and therefore awarding no equitable relief).
354. COONTZ, supra note 39, at 263-69; STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 203-10 (1988); see also
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights
and Family Law in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017,
2048 (2000); Walter Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage - An Appraisal of Trends
in Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88, 97 (1960).
355. MINTz & KELLOGG, supra note 354, at 205-10.
356. Id. at 205-06.
357. Id. at 209.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Over the past fifteen years the number of opposite sex couples cohabiting has
increased. The 2000 Census reported 5.5 million cohabitants (4.9 million of which are of
the opposite sex) compared to 3.2 million in Census 1990. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS
2000 SPECIAL REPORT, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000
(2003). In addition, according to the Current Population Survey (CPS), the number of co-
habitants in 1996 was approximately 2.86 million compared to approximately 4.88 million
cohabitants in 2005, nearly a sixty percent increase in just under ten years. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, MARCH AND ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPLEMENTS (2006). Although the surveys are different, they both come to the same
conclusion that cohabitation is on the rise. Id.
361. The change is reflected in the legal digests, where designations changed from
"bastards" to "illegitimate children" to "out-of-wedlock." 4A NEW CAL. DIGEST MCKINNEY
364 (1964) (referring to "Bastards" and 'Illegitimacy"); CAL. DIGEST OF OFFICIALREPORTS
3D MCKINNEY, 4th Series 108 (1996) (referring to "Illegitimacy" and "Parent and Child");
10 WEST'S CAL. DIGEST 189 (1973) (referring to "Bastards"); 6 WEST CAL. DIGEST 2d 494
(2005) (referring to "Children Out-of-Wedlock").
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parent-child relationship.362 In California, the turning point regarding
the law of unmarried cohabitants came with the enactment of no-
fault divorce in 1969.38
In Marriage of Cary,364 the court of appeal used the enactment
of no-fault divorce to revive common-law marriage implicitly under
the guise of an "actual family relationship.,,365 Although this revival
was short-lived, the law regarding property rights of unmarried co-
habitants underwent re-evaluation. Paul and Janet Cary had what
would have been considered a common-law marriage, having lived
together for eight years and held themselves out as husband and
wife to friends, family, and the community. 66 Janet took Paul's sur-
name.367 They had four children together.36 They intertwined their
financial affairs, buying property together, borrowing money, obtain-
ing credit together, and "otherwise conducted all business as husband
and wife. 369 Paul worked outside the home, and Janet stayed home
and took care of the children and house.37" They acquired property
using Paul's earnings.371 If they had been married that property
would have been community property and divided equally.372 The
trial court determined that the property should be divided equally
because of their "actual family relationship," and Paul appealed.373
The court of appeal was willing to extend the Family Law Act
to Paul and Janet's relationship, based on the objective of the Act to
do away with "fault": "[b]y the Family Law Act the Legislature has
announced it to be the public policy of this state that concepts of 'guilt'
(and punishment therefor) and 'innocence' (and reward therefor) are
no longer relevant in the determination of family property rights,
whether there be a legal marriage or not....,3 Paul and Janet's re-
lationship was deemed to be a "family," so it came under the Family
Law Act, giving Janet rights as if she were a legal wife.375 Clearly,
362. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2006).
363. The Family Law Act of 1969 adopted no-fault divorce. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West
1970). Thus, the only grounds for divorce are "irreconcilable differences, which have
caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage" or "incurable insanity." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2310(a)(b) (West 2006). The grounds must be "pleaded generally." Id.
364. 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
365. Id. at 862.
366. Id. at 863.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
375. Id. at 867.
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adherence to that doctrine would have revived common-law mar-
riage.176 The Cary "actual family relationship" doctrine was short-
lived, and in 1976 the California Supreme Court overturned it in
Marvin v. Marvin. 77 The court in Marvin criticized the reasoning of
Cary and substituted the express and implied contract doctrine to
assess unmarried cohabitants' rights to property accumulated during
their relationship.3 7 The court was mindful that a contract doctrine
could be considered a resurrection of common-law marriage but denied
that its decision was an attempt to do so.
379
The landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin310 overturned the Cary
doctrine of "actual family relationship" yet liberalized the prior law
regarding unmarried cohabitants' property rights.3 1 The case sce-
nario in Marvin resembled an updated version of "a scheme of an ad-
venturess,""2 with Michelle Triola Marvin attempting to gain rights
to the fortune of movie star Lee Marvin.383 The California Supreme
Court used the opportunity to expand the rights of unmarried cohabi-
tants.3 4 The court concluded:
(1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distri-
bution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship;
such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision.
(2) The courts should enforce express contracts between non-
marital partners except to the extent that the contract is ex-
plicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual
services.
376. See Patrick Nielson, Note, In Re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation,
25 HASTINGs L.J. 1226, 1246-47 (1974); Laurel Olson, Comment, In Re Marriage of Carey
[sic]: The End of the Putative-Meretricious Spouse Distinction in California, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 436, 447 (1975). The Cary doctrine was criticized as imposing "upon men and
women who choose to live together in nonmarital cohabitation a lifestyle characterized
by the restrictions formerly associated with traditional marriage." Herma Hill Kay & Carol
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937, 953 (1977).
377. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
378. Id. at 120-22. The court noted that the Family Law Act does not explicitly address
property rights of unmarried cohabitants, nor did the legislative history suggest that the
legislature considered that subject. Id. at 120 n. 19.
379. "We do not seek to resurrect the doctrine of common-law marriage, which was
abolished in California by statute in 1895." Id. at 122 n.24.
380. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
381. Id. at 120-22.
382. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
383. During their relationship, Lee Marvin was the star of several films: Cat Ballou
in 1965 (for which he won an Oscar), The Dirty Dozen in 1967, Hell in the Pacific in 1968,
and Paint Your Wagon in 1969. See Ann Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1381-82 (2001). Michelle's claim was for $1.8 million or half his earnings during
their relationship. Id.
384. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
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(3) In the absence of an express contract, the courts should
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement
of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit under-
standing between the parties. The courts may also employ
the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such
as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the
facts of the case.3 85
The first conclusion overturned the Cary doctrine, and the third
conclusion recognized the unfairness of the prior rule that "a nonmar-
ital partner who rendered services in the absence of express contract
could assert no right to property acquired during the relationship.""
The court held that the legislature in enacting no-fault divorce did not
intend to change the law dealing with nonmarital partners which
"had been fixed entirely by judicial decision." '387 The court then went
on to "fix" prior judicial decisions.388 The unfairness of the prior rule
was that it did not "permit a nonmarital partner to assert rights based
on accepted principles of implied contract or equity."38 9 The third con-
clusion granting a cohabitant the right to claim an implied-in-fact
contract and the possibility of equitable relief marked a significant
change from prior law that had limited implied contracts to the con-
tribution of funds and had precluded equitable remedies.39 °
The unfairness of the prior law was evident when applied to the
Cary facts. All property acquired during their relationship was trace-
able to Paul's earnings.391 Had they been married, the property would
have been community property.392 Because they were not married,
Janet would have had to prove an express agreement to share the
property,393 which Paul probably would deny. Janet would not have
been able to prove an implied agreement because she could provide
no evidence that she had contributed funds to the acquisition of the
property.394 That result would be unfair to Janet because it would
allow Paul "to retain a disproportionate amount of the property. 395
The court recognized that courts should "fairly apportion property
385. Id.
386. Id. at 119.
387. Id. at 120.
388. Id. at 121.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 122-23.
391. Cary v. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
392. Id. at 863.
393. Id. at 864.
394. Id. at 863.
395. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976).
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accumulated through mutual effort." '96 The "mutual effort" was Paul
working outside the home and Janet caring for the home and the
children.39 7 Thus, through the mechanism of implied contract, the
Court recognized that a traditional marital-like relationship in which
a woman provided homemaking services could be the basis for an
agreement to share property.
The court's second conclusion regarding express contracts recog-
nized that cohabitants will "voluntarily live together and engage in
sexual relations" and that such factors will not preclude them from
contracting regarding their property.398 Yet the Court stated that "a
contract between nonmarital partners will be enforced unless ex-
pressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual
services., 399 The prohibition against "meretricious sexual services"
means that cohabitants "cannot lawfully contract to pay for the per-
formance of sexual services, for such a contract is, in essence, an
agreement for prostitution and unlawful for that reason."4 ° Thus
many relationships that would formerly have been considered im-
moral because a couple lived together would not be considered illegal
consideration for a contract to share property. The court even noted
many reasons couples live together without marrying: to "avoid the
strictures of the community property system," to avoid the commit-
ment marriage implies, to avoid the loss of benefits, to avoid the "dif-
ficulty and expense of dissolving a prior marriage," to try out living
together as a "prelude to marriage," or to live together under the mis-
taken belief that they have a common-law marriage.401 The determi-
nation of what the couple intends regarding the property accumulated
during the relationship "can only be ascertained by a more search-
ing inquiry into the nature of their relationship."402 Thus an inquiry
into the facts of their relationship becomes relevant in determining
whether they have an enforceable agreement to share property.
In Marvin, Michelle's complaint alleged a marital-like relation-
ship even though Lee was still married to Betty Marvin at the time
Michelle and Lee started living together in 1964.403 Their relationship
lasted until 1970, when Lee compelled her to leave his household.4 4
Michelle alleged that she and Lee had orally agreed that "they would
396. Id.
397. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
398. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116.
399. Id. at 114.
400. Id. at 116.
401. Id. at 117 n.11.
402. Id.
403. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110-11.
404. Id.
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combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and
all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individu-
ally or combined. 4 °5 In addition, she claimed that they had agreed
that she would "give up her lucrative career as an entertainer" to
devote her time to being Lee's "companion, homemaker, housekeeper
and cook" and that Lee would provide for her "financial support and
needs for the rest of her life. '406 The trial court granted Lee a judg-
ment on the pleadings, and Michelle appealed.4 7 Despite the exten-
sive revision of the law by the court in Marvin, all Michelle gained
was a chance to prove her case.408
Michelle failed.40 9 Even though they had lived together for five
years, the court found that their initial agreement was that they
would live together "as unmarried persons so long as they both en-
joyed their mutual companionship and affection. 41 0 This case was
clearly a he-said, she-said battle, and the court believed his assertion
they never had an agreement of the sort that Michelle had alleged.4
Most striking was the finding that the "plaintiff [Michelle] actually
benefitted economically and socially from the cohabitation of the
parties," including living expenses and substantial gifts.4"2 Although
the trial court felt that Michelle deserved something and fashioned
a one hundred four thousand dollar rehabilitative award, that award
was reversed on appeal. 4 13 The court of appeal ruled that the award
was not technically part of the pleadings, but even so, an equitable
remedy was not appropriate as Michelle was not wronged and had
actually benefitted from the relationship. 4 4 Thus Michelle was the
classic example of the adventuress who enjoyed the relationship of a
wealthy man and then tried to gain economic benefit from that rela-
tionship. Again, unmarried cohabitation was in the spotlight. The
major result for Michelle was an unsuccessful lawsuit, but for unmar-
ried cohabitants with a marital-like relationship, the Marvin decision
represented recognition that their sexual relationship was not an im-
pediment to proving implied-in-fact agreements to share property.415
405. Id.
406. Id. at 110.
407. Id. at 111.
408. Id. at 123.
409. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 558-59.
412. Id. at 557.
413. Id. at 559.
414. Id. at 558.
415. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976).
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PART II
A. Unmarried Cohabitants'Rights after Marvin
1. The California Experience
The relevance of the unmarried cohabitants' relationship was
ostensibly reduced to a bare minimum in Marvin v. Marvin.416 The
California Supreme Court established that a cohabitant's right to
share property depends on either an express or implied contract.417
The only caveat was that a contract between cohabitants will not be
enforced if it is "explicitly founded on the consideration of meretri-
cious sexual services." '418 One could therefore expect that inquiry into
an unmarried couple's relationship would only be to determine if the
contract was based on meretricious sexual services, a euphemism for
prostitution. For instance, if the couple lived together only sporadi-
cally, a court could interpret it to be a mere sexual relationship and
that would not even rise to the level of cohabitation.4 9
In examining whether meretricious sexual services were the
basis for the contract and in determining whether an implied con-
tract existed based on conduct of the parties, it was almost inevitable
that the cohabitants' relationship would assume more relevance. The
same question arose about the woman in the cohabitant relationship:
was she an adventuress or did she have the role of virtuous wife? At-
torneys soon realized that the most sympathetic Marvin claims were
brought by women who had long-term relationships in which the man
worked outside of the home acquiring property in his name and the
woman stayed home and took care of their children.42" Thus, a woman
in that position deserved the protection of an implied contract.42' One
such case was Alderson v. Alderson.22
The Alderson relationship started as a typical traditional rela-
tionship that ordinarily would have led to marriage.423 Steve Alderson
416. Id. at 122.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 110.
419. Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding an agreement
for financial support was unenforceable because the parties did not cohabit); Taylor v.
Fields, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the couple's forty-
two-year intimate relationship was insufficient for Marvin agreement when parties did
not live together).
420. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
421. Id.
422. Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
423. Id. at 611.
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met Jonne Koenig in December, 1966, in Reno, Nevada.424 Jonne lived
at home with her parents and worked in a local bank.425 They fell in
love and spoke about marriage.426 In September, 1967, Jonne followed
Steve to Portland, Oregon where they planned to marry. For some
reason, they never formally married, but their cohabitation lasted for
twelve years.428 Both worked initially, Steve as a civil engineer, Jonne
as a receptionist. 429 They rented a house in Portland.43 ° They depos-
ited their earnings in a joint bank account and filed joint federal in-
come tax returns for 1967 as a married couple.431
The following year they moved to Eugene, Oregon because of
Steve's job, and there they purchased their first home.432 The pur-
chase was a joint decision and their first endeavor in investing in real
property. 433 Even though the title was in Steve's name, the down pay-
ment came from their joint savings account.434 Jonne understood that
that they owned the property together.435 Jonne continued working
and in December, 1969, gave birth to their first child.436 Over the
course of their relationship, they had three children.
Between 1968 and 1979, they acquired fourteen properties, eleven
in California where they eventually settled.48 Most were purely for
investment.439 They jointly made the decisions to purchase the prop-
erty and the down payments came from their joint savings accounts
or loans from Jonne's parents.440 Seven of the titles stated that Steve
and Jonne were husband and wife or were married persons.441 Other
titles did not designate their marital status.442 Jonne was involved
with management of the properties.443 She collected rents, paid bills,
and kept the books for the rental properties.444 She helped to repair
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
435. Id. at 611-12.
436. Id. at 612.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
THE SCHEMES OF ADVENTURESSES
and fix up the properties."' She viewed the properties as "our houses"
that would be investments for the future of their children.446
During their entire twelve-year relationship, they held them-
selves out as husband and wife to everyone including family and
friends.447 Jonne used Steve's surname as did their children. 48 They
maintained joint bank accounts and filed joint federal income tax re-
turns.44 9 In December, 1979, they separated.450 Jonne moved out.
45 1
She signed quitclaim deeds in Steve's favor for all the houses but tes-
tified that she did so under duress.452 In 1980, Jonne filed a complaint
against Steve, including a cause of action to set aside the quitclaim
deeds and equally divide the eleven California properties.453 Jonne
also sued Steve for assault and battery because he broke her arm
after she first filed suit against him.4M Steve was convicted of battery
and the court considered that issue established.455
In 1982, the trial court rendered judgment for Jonne, concluding
that the quitclaim deeds should be set aside and that Jonne was en-
titled to an undivided one-half of the properties. 4 6 The court ordered
that the properties be equally divided.45 7 Steve appealed on the basis
that their agreement was illegal and thus unenforceable, but he lost.
458
The court of appeal found that substantial evidence supported the
trial court's findings: the parties had "an implied contract to share
equally any and all the property acquired during the course of their
relationship" and that the contract was legal and enforceable and did
not rest on "consideration of meretricious sexual services. 459
The court in Alderson catalogued the evidence that supported
the implied agreement, much of which would also have supported a
common-law marriage: they held themselves out as husband and
wife, Jonne and the children took Steve's surname, and they pooled
their financial resources and used them to purchase property.4 ° The
way they treated the property certainly added to their "sharing"
445. Id.
446. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 612-13.
456. Id. at 613.
457. Id.
458. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
459. Id.
460. Id.
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relationship: Jonne participated in the management of their prop-
erty and almost all of the titles were taken jointly and seven were
taken as husband and wife.46 1
On the issue of whether their relationship was meretricious,
Steve and Jonne's relationship clearly would have been a common-
law marriage if such a marriage were permitted in California.462
Jonne's testimony was most damaging to Steve's claim of a meretri-
cious relationship. 46 In cross-examination by Steve's attorney, it
became crystal clear that Jonne viewed herself as Steve's wife: "I
was his wife, I mean, whatever a wife does," and "we just were living
together as we were married. We did anything that any other mar-
ried couple did and we pooled together resources, we saved money,
we didn't buy things so we had money to buy houses. 46 4 The cross-
examination did not help Steve's cause, as the court of appeal found
that "there is no evidence that the agreement between Jonne and
Steve, or any part thereof, explicitly rests upon such a consider-
ation. '465 The Alderson case demonstrates that a marital-like rela-
tionship in which additional facts show sharing of property will
yield a successful Marvin claim.46' A "virtual" wife will yield shared
property rights.467
The Alderson case was almost identical to the Cary case. The
only difference was the doctrine that applied.46' To gain property
rights, both Janet Cary and Jonne Alderson could have succeeded
under Marvin. Instead of showing an actual family relationship as
required under Cary, Janet could have4 69 and Jonne actually did47°
demonstrate under Marvin,47' an implied-in-fact contract that was
not based on meretricious sexual services. Under both doctrines, the
marital-like relationship was highly relevant, if not determinative
of whether the couple shared property.472 In both, having a relation-
ship that resembled common-law marriage was a major component
of success.47'
461. Id.
462. See People v. Beevers, 33 P. 844 (Cal. 1893).
463. Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 615-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
464. Id. at 616 n.1.
465. Id. at 617.
466. Id. at 620.
467. Id.
468. Compare Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) with Cary
v. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
469. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 862-67.
470. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
471. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 106 (Cal. 1976).
472. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 610-20; Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 862-64.
473. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 610-20; Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 862-64.
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Even in a case reflecting an updated version of marriage, the
marital-like relationship of the cohabitants was relevant.474 In
Maglica v. Maglica, one issue concerned whether the Maglicas had
an implied contract to share property accumulated during their rela-
tionship.47 On the one hand, the Maglicas' relationship resembled
a traditional marriage.476 Claire and Anthony Maglica met soon after
Anthony divorced his previous wife.477 They began living together and
held themselves out as husband and wife, and Claire began using
Anthony's last name even though they never married.47 What dif-
fered from a traditional marriage was that Claire worked side by side
in Anthony's business, and was paid an equal salary, and the busi-
ness prospered in part due to Claire's "great ideas and hard work. 479
Their relationship began in 1971 and ended in 1992 when Claire dis-
covered that Anthony was trying to transfer stock in his company to
his children but not to her.4"' In June 1993 she sued and the court
awarded her eighty-four million dollars for breach of fiduciary duty
and quantum meruit.4 sl The appeal was based on faulty jury instruc-
tions regarding quantum meruit and implied-in-fact contracts.4 2
On the issue of implied-in-fact contracts, the court of appeal ob-
jected that the jury instructions implied the facts of their relation-
ship had to be ignored: their living together, their holding themselves
as husband and wife, and Claire providing services as a constant com-
panion and confidant.48 3 That omission was misleading according to
the Court: "[t]rue, none of these facts by themselves and alone neces-
sarily compels the conclusion that there was an implied contract. But
that does not mean that these facts cannot, in conjunction with all the
facts and circumstances of the case, establish an implied contract. In
point of fact, they can. 484
The court pointed to Alderson to support its conclusion that a
marital-like relationship is indeed among the facts that would allow
474. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
475. Id. at 110.
476. Id. at 103.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
481. Id.
482. Id. at 105. The main issue on appeal was the definition of benefit under the doctrine
of quantum meruit. Id. The Court of Appeal explained that "[i]t is one thing to require
that the defendant be benefited by services, it is quite another to measure the reasonable
value of those services by the value by which the defendant was 'benefited' as a result of
them." Id. Thus, the jury instruction was in error, and the case was remanded for a new
trial. Id. at 110. See Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52-54 (1978).
483. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108.
484. Id.
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a court to find an implied-in-fact contract to share property." 5 Thus
the court ordered a new trial with jury instructions which directed
that those facts, if "taken together and in conjunction with other
facts bearing more directly on the alleged arrangement to share prop-
erty, can show an implied agreement to share property."4" Not sur-
prisingly, on remand, the case settled in favor of Claire." 7 Because
of Claire's activities in Anthony's business and the marital-like re-
lationship, she would have had an excellent chance of proving an
implied-in-fact agreement to share in Anthony's business.488
A couple's marital-like relationship is thus a strong factor in
showing that a couple agreed to share property. The same factors that
were relevant to finding a common-law marriage in the nineteenth
century are still relevant today when a court inquires whether there
is an implied-in-fact agreement to share property.4 9 In the 1890 White
case, finding a common-law marriage was dependent on whether a
marital-like relationship existed.49 ° In White, the probative facts were
the length of the relationship, holding themselves out as husband and
wife, and the woman taking the man's name.491 In conjunction with
those facts was the additional fact of "sharing" a life together by hav-
ing four children together.492 In nineteenth-century California, show-
ing a common-law marriage without a marital-like relationship was
difficult.493 Similarly in today's California, showing an implied-in-
fact agreement to share property without a traditional marital-like
relationship is difficult.494
2. The Washington State Experience
Although Washington formally abolished common-law marriage
in 1892, 495 the Washington Supreme Court has informally revived
485. Id. at 109 (citing Alderson v. Alderson, Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
486. Id. at 109-10.
487. Richard Marosi, Maglicas Reach a Palimony Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2000, at B1.
488. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 109-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
489. Compare Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) with White
v. White, 23 P. 276 (Cal. 1890).
490. White, 23 P. at 276-83.
491. Id. at 280-81.
492. Id. at 280.
493. See supra Part I.
494. See supra notes 418-21 and accompanying text.
495. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.070 (West 2006); In re McLaughlin's Estate, 30
P. 651, 658 (Wash. 1892) (holding "[lt is clear that... the legislature was of the opinion
that all attempts to establish the [marriage] relationship, other than in accordance with
the ways provided by the statute would be void, and would be so held"); In re Smith's
Estate, 4 Wash. 702, 703 (1892) (reasoning "[w]e have lately decided, however ... that
there could be no common-law marriage in this state .. "); see Burton Wheelon, Note,
2007] THE SCHEMES OF ADVENTURESSES 529
common-law marriage in the guise of "meretricious relationships"
that are "stable cohabiting relationships." '496 A meretricious rela-
tionship in Washington has a completely opposite meaning from the
California definition of meretricious.49 7 Instead of relating to "prosti-
tution,""49 the Washington Supreme Court characterized a meretri-
cious relationship as "a stable marital-like relationship where both
parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them
does not exist." '499 The Court insisted that "marital-like" is "a mere
analogy because defining meretricious relations as related to mar-
riage would create a de facto common-law marriage, which this court
has refused to do."500
Despite the Court's protestation, if a court finds that a couple had
a meretricious relationship, the court will treat the property accumu-
lated during the relationship as if the couple were married." 1 Also
the factors the court specified for determining whether a couple's rela-
tionship is meretricious seem suspiciously like a common-law mar-
riage: "continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose
of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects,
and the intent of the parties."' 2 In the two cases that established
these factors, Marriage of Lindsey and Connell v. Francisco, a mere-
tricious relationship was conceded and the only issue was how to di-
vide the property accumulated during the relationship.0 3 The court
Common-Law Marriage, 1 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1926).
496. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995). In a recent case, the court of
appeals opted for a different phrase to describe the relationship that would determine
cohabitants' rights: "committed intimate relationship." Olver v. Fowler, 126 P.3d 69, 72
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006). The court explained that "[w]e share earlier courts' distaste for
the antiquated term with its negative connotations ... " Id. at 72 n.9; Marriage of Lindsey,
678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984).
497. Compare Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 331 and Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 with Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).
498. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116.
499. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834; Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 331.
500. Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000) (emphasis added). See
Connell, 898 P. 2d at 835 (explaining that "a meretricious relationship is not the same
as marriage"). Rights that flow from a meretricious relationship differ from those arising
from a marriage. For instance, property rights are not as extensive. Connell, 898 P. 2d
at 835-36. Under Washington law, a court is instructed to distribute the community and
separate property of a married couple as "shall appear just and equitable." WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.080 (Wash. 2005). If, however, a meretricious relationship is established
the court will divide only the "property that would have been characterized as commu-
nity property had the parties been married." Connell, 127 898 P.2d at 836. Other benefits
of marriage are not extended to meretricious relationships: unemployment compensation,
attorney fees in a dissolution action, and insurance benefits. Id. at 835.
501. Connell, 127 898 P.2d at 836.
502. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770.
503. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 (explaining "The Superior Court found Connell and
Francisco were parties to a meretricious relationship. This finding is not contested");
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in Lindsey overturned prior law as "unpredictable and at times oner-
ous;''5°" the court in Connell established that only property acquired
during the relationship should be divided "so that one party is not
unjustly enriched at the end of such a relationship." ' 5
The more recent case of Marriage of Pennington discussed
whether two couples' relationships would qualify as a meretricious
relationship. °6 In both cases, the Washington Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court finding of a meretricious relationship. °7 The
Court was unwilling to give an expansive reading of the determi-
native factors.0 ' The first couple, Clark Pennington and Evelyn Van
Pevenage, had a twelve-year relationship although they separated
and reconciled several times before the relationship ended.0 9 Van
Pevenage claimed that property acquired during their relationship
should be treated as community property.510 The trial court awarded
her over two hundred thousand dollars.1 Pennington appealed. 12 Ac-
cording to the supreme court, the factors of a meretricious relation-
ship were not supported by the evidence.513 The factor of duration was
met, but Van Pevenage failed to show continuous cohabitation.514
According to the court, because Van Pevenage intended a long-term
relationship with the expectation of marriage but Pennington refused
to marry her, their relationship failed to demonstrate the requisite in-
tent to establish a "stable, longterm, [sic] cohabiting relationship.""5
Her absences from the home and her relationship with another man
were also detrimental to meeting the factor of "mutual intent to form
a meretricious relationship." '516 The court found the relationship
purpose requirements were met because the relationship included
Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (explaining "[tihe existence of a
meretricious relationship was not contested by either appellant or respondent and was
not an issue").
504. Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 331. The court explained the prior law and its shortcomings
and concluded that this case presented an appropriate circumstance to overrule the prior
law. Id. at 330-31. See Gavin M. Parr, What is a "Meretricious Relationship'T: An Analysis
of Cohabitant Property Rights under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243, 1245-
48 (1999); John E. Wallace, The Afterlife of the Meretricious Relationship Doctrine:
Applying the Doctrine Post Mortem, 29 SEArMLE U.L. REV. 243, 246-55 (2005).
505. Connell, 898 P.2d at 836.
506. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
507. Id. at 773.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 766-67.
510. Id. at 767-68.
511. Id. at 768.
512. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. 2000).
513. Id. at 771.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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companionship, friendship, love, sex, mutual support, and caring.517
The court found that the relationship failed to meet the pooling of re-
sources requirement, even though the couple shared some living ex-
penses, because pooling of resources requires that "the parties jointly
invested their time, effort, or financial resources in any specific asset
to justify the equitable division of the parties' property acquired dur-
ing the course of the relationship.""51 This couple's relationship was
not "marital-like" in that it did not reflect the stability of a marriage,
where the couple shares a name, shares assets, and holds themselves
out as husband and wife. Instead, the relationship appeared simply
to be a long-term, tempestuous sexual relationship. Although many
marriages could also be long-term and tempestuous with separations,
reconciliations, and infidelities, the meretricious relationship accord-
ing to the court in Pennington seemed to envision a very traditional
model of marriage.1 9
The second couple, James Nash and Diana Chesterfield, sepa-
rated after a relationship that spanned from 1986 to 1995, but they
only lived together in Chesterfield's home from 1989 to 1993.520 The
trial court equitably distributed the property acquired during their
relationship which resulted in a judgment of over seventy-five thou-
sand dollars in Chesterfield's favor.52" ' The court of appeals affirmed,
concluding that their relationship was "functioning as one would ex-
pect a married couple to function with regard to work." '522 The court
of appeals did not find it dispositive that Nash and Chesterfield did
not hold title together, hold themselves out as married, or commingle
their resources other than for living expenses.52 3 The Washington
Supreme Court thought otherwise.524
Viewed as a "modern" marriage, Nash and Chesterfield's rela-
tionship could be considered typical. They met while Chesterfield
was still married but separated from her husband.525 Nash dated
other women until he moved into Chesterfield's home.526 They had an
exclusive relationship for approximately four and one-half years.527
During that time they kept their own names but had a joint checking
517. Id. at 772.
518. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 771-72 (Wash. 2000).
519. Id. at 764-72.
520. Id. at 768.
521. Chesterfield v. Nash, 978 P.2d 551, 553 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
522. Id. at 554.
523. Id.
524. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 773 (Wash. 1999).
525. Id. at 768.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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account for living expenses to which both contributed.12' They also
had separate checking accounts and separate investment accounts.529
Both were working, Nash as a dentist and Chesterfield as a sales-
person at Nordstrom's. ° They assisted each other in their work: Nash
helped Chesterfield with her work-related travel logs; Chesterfield
assisted Nash in his dental practice."' They shared mortgage pay-
ments even though the home was in Chesterfield's name. 2 After they
separated, they reconciled briefly and discussed marriage but perma-
nently ended their relationship. 33 Many married couples today would
arrange their affairs exactly in this way, but the Washington Supreme
Court applied stricter requirements for establishing a meretricious
relationship.534
According to the court, the duration of the relationship was long
enough to support a meretricious relationship. 5 It was not contin-
uous, however, especially since Chesterfield was still married when
she began dating Nash and Nash and Chesterfield separated and
then reconciled at the end of their relationship.5 36 The evidence was
also insufficient to satisfy the mutual intent and pooling of resources
factors.537 Again Chesterfield's marriage to another man was viewed
as detrimental to forming mutual intent.53 Their "sharing" behavior
was insufficient to establish that they jointly pooled their "time, ef-
fort, or financial resources." '539 The Court found it significant that they
purchased no property together and had separate bank accounts and
careers. 54 ° Overall Chesterfield's case was much stronger than Van
Pevenage's in that Chesterfield's case involved more sharing behav-
ior, but still the court was unwilling to find a meretricious relation-
ship." 1 Absent the indicia of a common-law marriage such as holding
themselves out as husband and wife and sharing extensive time and
totally joint finances, a meretricious relationship is very difficult to
prove in Washington. 42 Both Van Pevengage and Chesterfield could
528. Id.
529. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 768.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 771-73.
535. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 772.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 772-73.
541. Pennington, 14 P.3d at 769-73.
542. Id.
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be viewed as adventuresses who were trying to take advantage of
the men with whom they cohabited and not as virtuous wives.
Several cases following Pennington, all of them unpublished and
almost all of them finding that a meretricious relationship existed, il-
lustrate that the closer a relationship is to a traditional marriage the
greater possibility of success.1 3 The court found in only one of the ap-
pellate cases following Pennington, that a meretricious relationship
did not exist, Hobbs v. Bates.544 That case presented the unusual sce-
nario in which the male cohabitant, Mark Hobbs, was seeking division
of the female cohabitant's substantial Microsoft retirement plan and
stock options.545 Even though the couple had two children together
during their seven-year relationship, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court conclusion that no meretricious relationship existed. 6
The primary dispute revolved around three of the Pennington fac-
tors: continuous cohabitation, purpose of their relationship, and fi-
nancial contributions to the relationship/joint ventures.547 Although
their tumultuous relationship spanned seven years, continuous co-
habitation lasted only two years.54 The co-parenting of their children
supported a finding of purpose, but the maintenance of separate
finances throughout their entire relationship outweighed the co-
parenting. 9 Mark Hobbs and Linda Bates therefore "did not function
as an economic unit."5 The court of appeals commented that pooling
of economic resources and functioning as an economic unit is "an im-
portant factor" since the claim of a meretricious relationship "operates
primarily as a property claim."55' Despite their co-parenting, the trial
court found no meretricious relationship existed and therefore no
equitable division of property was necessary.552 In this case, Mark
Hobbs was cast in the role of adventurer, taking advantage of the
woman with whom he cohabited.
543. Marriage of Bostain, 2005 WL 1177586 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2005); Hobbs v. Bates,
2004 WL 1465949 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004); Gower v. Shinstrom, 2003 WL 352880 (Wash.
App. Div. 1 2003); Vo v. Tran, 2003 WL 22847074 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2003); Rota v.
Vandver, 2001 WL 1521996 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2001).
544. Hobbs v. Bates, 2004 WL 1465949 (Wash. App. Div. 1).
545. Id. at 1.
546. Id. at 1-2. The court of appeals also rejected Hobbs's argument that the court should
adopt the 2002 American Law Institute's Principles of Law of Family Dissolution, § 6.03
(2002). Id. at 8-9. Under those Principles, persons may be considered domestic partners
if they maintain a common household with a common child for a continuous cohabitation
period, suggesting that two years of cohabitation would be sufficient. Id.
547. Id. at 10.
548. Id. at 10-11.
549. Id. at 11-12.
550. Hobbs v. Bates, 2004 WL 1465949, at 10-12 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004). An added
factor was that that Hobbs wanted to marry, but Bates did not. Id. at 11.
551. Id. at 11.
552. Id. at 7.
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In contrast to Hobbs, in Vo v. Tran, the female cohabitant,
Neghia Tran, challenged the trial court's finding that her nineteen-
year cohabitation with Viet Vo was a meretricious relationship in
attempting to resist his property claims.553 Their nineteen-year co-
habitation preceded a seven-year marriage.5" Tran's arguments were
that the relationship was solely for economic convenience and to help
each other adjust to living in the United States. 5 Those arguments
were futile.55 The length of their relationship and their pooling of
resources, both in buying a house together and maintaining joint
accounts for living and household expenses, supported the trial court's
finding of a meretricious relationship.557 In this case, the relation-
ship resembled a very long-term marriage with pooling of economic
resources and thus was a meretricious one.555 The significance of
these cases is that the gender roles were reversed: in Hobbs, the male
cohabitant was seeking benefits of the relationship, and in Vo, the
woman was resisting the male cohabitant's claims to the benefits of
the relationship.559 Thus men can be cast in the role of "adventurer."
In other cases involving disputes over property accumulated dur-
ing the relationship, courts have found meretricious relationships.
These cases were more typical, as it was the woman who was seek-
ing the benefits of the relationship. In Rota v. Vandver and Gower
v. Shinstrom, the relationships were long-term, twelve years and
twenty-two years respectively.5" Although neither of the couples ever
married and there was some break in their cohabitation, pooling of
resources and services in both cases were significant enough to sup-
port a finding of a meretricious relationship.56 '
3. Reality of Committed Intimate Relationship
In the wake of the increase in unmarried cohabitation, courts
have struggled to delineate which relationships are deserving of some
553. Id.
554. Id. at 2.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 2-3.
558. Id. at 2-3. Similarly, in Marriage of Bostain, 2005 WL 1177586 (Wash. App. Div.
2 2005), the court of appeals affirmed a finding of a meretricious relationship in which
the couple cohabited for approximately seven years before they married. Id. at 5-6. Their
marriage lasted for three years. Id. Although the relationship was not as long as the rela-
tionship in Vo, other factors were strong such as pooling resources and the fact that they
married. Id.
559. Hobbs v. Bates, 2004 WL 1465949, at 10-12 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004); Vo v. Tran,
2003 WL 22847074, at 2 (Wash. App. Div. 1).
560. Gower v. Shinstrom, 2003 WL 352880 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2001); Rota v. Vandver,
2001 WL 1521996 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2001).
561. Gower, 2003 WL 352880 at 1-2; Rota, 2001 WL 1521996 at 1-2.
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of the rights gained through ceremonial marriage."' The license and
solemnization requirements of marriage automatically and instantly
provide those rights. To distinguish ceremonial marriage from cohabi-
tant relationships, the courts have required that cohabitants meet a
much higher standard for attaining shared property rights.63 In other
words, unmarried cohabitants have to be more "married" than those
who obtain a license and have a ceremony.5 4
Stephanie Coontz suggested that in Europe and North America,
four stages are necessary before cohabitation and marriage reach al-
most equal status.5' The first stage is when most people marry with-
out living together.66 The second stage marks a time when people
from many walks of life live together but eventually marry especially
if they become parents.5 7 The third stage emerges when cohabitation
becomes accepted as an alternative to marriage.5 61 In the fourth and
final stage, cohabitation and marriage become virtually indistin-
guishable legally and socially.5 9 Legally, that final stage has not been
reached in the courts of California and Washington.
Legislative efforts to formalize non-traditional relationships, like
domestic partnership legislation, foreshadow the beginning of equat-
ing cohabitation with marriage.5 70 For instance, California's most re-
cent domestic partnership legislation, effective January 1, 2005, gives
community property rights to "two adults who have chosen to share
one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mu-
tual caring.5 71 The rights bestowed on same-sex domestic partners,
562. In this struggle, other models have been suggested to categorize these relationships.
See Am. Law Institute, § 6.03 (2002) (setting forth guidelines for determining domestic
partners); David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and For Lovers of All Sorts, A Status
Other Than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1352-54 (2001) (recommending a
"designated friends" status); Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common-law marriage, and
the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1870-71 (1987) (recommending
a "de facto partnership" status).
563. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
564. See supra Part II.A.1-2. Professor Herma Hill Kay has suggested that "[p]erhaps
a more realistic analogy for marriage in the twenty-first century is the joint venture....
A joint venture presupposes persons capable of contributing assets to the enterprise and
sharing in the risks, thus, fitting the model of spouses who are self-sufficient at the out-
set of the undertaking." Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An
Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth
Century, 88 CALUF. L. REV. 2017, 2089 (2000).
565. COONTZ, supra note 39, at 2701-71.
566. Id. at 272.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of
Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1439-42 (2001) (arguing that
cohabitation should not be treated similarly).
570. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (2006).
571. Id.
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as well as opposite-sex partners where at least one is over the age
of sixty-two, are identical to married people in California.572
For those couples who are able to marry but choose not to do so,
the courts require a relationship that is "marital-like" to succeed in
gaining shared property rights. What does "marital-like" mean? One
Washington court has recently chosen the phrase "committed inti-
mate relationship" to describe the type of relationship necessary to
establish property rights of unmarried cohabitants.573
The concept of an "intimate and committed relationship" in the
case of domestic partnership or a "committed intimate relationship"
in the case of unmarried cohabitants will surely be tested in the days
to come. Inevitably, the criteria for common-law marriage will emerge
as one of the major determinants of whether rights will be attained.
Rather than looking for an implied contract as in California, 4 states
should use a streamlined version of the Washington criteria5 75 for
determining whether that committed intimate relationship exists:
(1) Intimate Relationship: The length and type of relationship
(2) Committed Relationship: The intertwining of financial affairs.
An examination of two cases, Maglica from California and Pennington
from Washington, demonstrates how these criteria would be applied.
In Maglica, the length and type of relationship was like a
common-law marriage. 6 The couple in Maglica lived together for
twenty-one years, they held themselves out as husband and wife,
and Claire used Anthony Maglica's last name.577 Therefore, the length
and type of relationship would qualify the relationship as "intimate."
That criterion would be essentially identical to establishing common-
law marriage. The requirement of commitment through intertwining
financial affairs is to replace the license and ceremony of the mar-
riage statutes and show that there is a right to property accumulated
during their relationship. In Maglica, Claire could show the commit-
ment to the relationship with evidence of her working in the business
side-by-side with Anthony.575 The fact that they did not take property
together would not be detrimental to a claim by a person like Claire.
572. Id. The rights extend only to California law, because federal law under the Defense
of Marriage Act extend federal rights only to marriages between a man and a woman.
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
573. Olver v. Fowler, 126 P.3d 69, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
574. Some have argued that "contract is a poor model for intimate relations." Ira Mark
Ellman, "Contract Thinking" was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365,
1367 (2001). "Contract law offers little promise of guidance" in the definition of private
relationships. Kandoian, supra note 575, at 1868.
575. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
576. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
577. Id.
578. Id.
THE SCHEMES OF ADVENTURESSES
The very reason she was suing for property rights was that the prop-
erty was in Anthony's name.5 79 Thus, if both requirements can be met,
a claim for shared property rights would succeed.
In Pennington, where the court found the relationship of Nash
and Chesterfield insufficient, the intimate requirement would have
been harder to meet. Their relationship spanned nine years, but they
only lived together and dated exclusively for four years.80 Chester-
field provided no evidence that she took Nash's name, and they did
not hold themselves out as married.5"' As far as the commitment re-
quirement is concerned, they had a joint checking account for living
expenses and shared mortgage payments on Chesterfield's home but
otherwise kept their investments separate.8 2 They also assisted each
other in their work.8 3 However, the combination of a short relation-
ship unlike common-law marriage and only some intertwining of fi-
nancial affairs would be insufficient to meet the "committed intimate
relationship" standard.
The revival of common-law marriage will likely take the form of
determining which "relationships" are enough like traditional mar-
riage to warrant extension of shared property rights. Even if all states
declare that common-law marriage no longer exists, the rise of "com-
mitted intimate relationships" will take its place.
CONCLUSION
Common-law marriage in America is going the way of the buggy
whip, with the number of states recognizing common-law marriage
rapidly diminishing.584 Yet the problem of sorting out the property
rights of unmarried cohabitants still remains for the courts. The
experiences of California and Washington courts provide guidance
to the judiciary in these disputes over property.585 Those couples
who have a "committed intimate relationship" of long duration in
which they have intertwined financial affairs clearly have the best
chance to claim property rights. Whatever the doctrine used, whether
implied-in-fact contract in California or meretricious relationship in
Washington, the heart of the problem is whether the relationship in
question is enough like marriage to provide rights similar to those
of married people.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 768.
581. Id. at 764-773; Chesterfield v. Nash, 978 P.2d 551, 554 (Wash. Ct. App.).
582. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. 2000).
583. Id.
584. See supra notes 51-52.
585. See supra Part II.A.1.-2.
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The courts seem to use a very traditional model for marriage for
determining whether a cohabitant relationship is enough like mar-
riage to provide shared property rights. That model, a long-term re-
lationship with intertwined financial affairs, differs significantly from
many marriages today. Marriages today are very often short-term
with separate finances.
At the heart of the rationale for abolishing common-law marriage
is the notion that informal relationships will not be treated as mar-
riage. To receive the benefits of marriage, couples must marry and
not just cohabit. If they choose to cohabit without being married,
receiving the main benefit of marriage, rights to shared property, is
much more difficult. The higher burden of proving a marital-like
relationship is aimed at preventing the fraud of adventuresses (or
adventurers) who try to convert a mere informal relationship into
a formal one. These strict standards will unfortunately fail to pro-
vide some honest and virtuous people with property rights based on
their relationship.
